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[455] 
Advising Terrorism: Material Support,  
Safe Harbors, and Freedom of Speech 
Peter Margulies* 
Ever since Brandenburg v. Ohio, departures from content neutrality under the First 
Amendment have received strict scrutiny. However, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project (“HLP”), the Supreme Court decided that the perils of content regulation were 
less pressing than was the need to curb the human capital of groups, such as Hamas, 
designated as foreign terrorist organizations (“DFTOs”). As a result, the Court upheld 
a statute that bars “material support” of terrorist organizations, ruling that the statute 
bars speech coordinated with DFTOs, including training in negotiation or the use of 
international law. Some commentators have labeled HLP as heralding a new 
McCarthyism. This Article argues that critics who condemn HLP as the reincarnation 
of Cold War content regulation overlook the tailored quality of the decision’s hybrid 
scrutiny model, its roots in the Framers’ concerns about foreign influence, and its 
surprising parallels with constitutional justifications for professional regulation. 
 
HLP is not the marked departure that critics claim. Just as professional regulation 
limits lawyers’ use of pretrial publicity, HLP reduced the impact of asymmetries in 
information that terrorist groups exploit. To constrain government, HLP’s framework 
of hybrid scrutiny also provides a safe harbor for the independent expression of ideas, 
and for scholars, journalists, human rights monitors, and attorneys. 
 
Nevertheless, HLP’s critics are right that the Court’s decision is flawed. Chief Justice 
Roberts’s opinion invited confusion about the First Amendment status of lending 
“legitimacy” to violence, which could quickly drain the safe harbor that the Court 
created for independent advocacy. The opinion also made a studied show of deference 
to official sources, disdaining independent accounts of terrorist groups’ penchant for 
defection. Only the next case will tell if these flaws were minor missteps in a balanced 
decision or signs of a more severe conflict with First Amendment values. 
 
 * Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. I was co-counsel on an amicus 
curiae brief that asked the Supreme Court to uphold the constitutionality of the federal material-
support statute, 18 U.SC. § 2339B, and to carve out safe harbors for journalists, scholars, human rights 
groups, and attorneys. See Brief for Scholars, Attorneys, and Former Public Officials with Experience 
in Terrorism-Related Issues as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (No. 08-1498), 2009 WL 507069. Portions of this Article were presented 
at a conference sponsored by the Center on Law and Security at New York University School of Law, 
entitled “The Constitution and National Security: The First Amendment Under Attack,” in November 
2010. I thank Bill Araiza, Renee Knake, and Larry Rosenthal for comments on a previous draft. 
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Introduction 
Attempts to regulate foreign terrorist groups expose ambivalence in 
First Amendment jurisprudence regarding asymmetries in information. 
On the one hand, courts apply intermediate scrutiny in the commercial 
speech context, asserting that information asymmetries between seller 
and consumer justify regulation.1 On the other hand, the specter of an 
information gap between government and citizen has driven heightened 
scrutiny of measures regulating political speech.2 Interactions with 
foreign powers such as terrorist groups summon both concerns. 
Just as U.S. corporations turn to bad accounting to present a 
pleasing profile to investors,3 terrorist organizations with ongoing plans 
for attacking innocents apply a veneer of nonviolence to attract financial 
contributions.4 Yet democracies ought to protect speech that conveys 
accurate information about events abroad, even if that information 
challenges government policy. Because of this tension, regulation of 
speech coordinated by terrorist groups should trigger a hybrid form of 
scrutiny, which the Supreme Court outlined in Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project (“HLP”), upholding Congress’s prohibition on material 
support to terrorist groups.5  
HLP has already attracted significant scholarly debate, with some 
commentators arguing that the statute and the Court’s decision harken 
back to the oppressive content regulation of the Cold War.6 Justice 
 
 1. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651–52 n.14 (1985) 
(upholding regulation requiring disclosures in lawyers’ contingency fee agreements on the grounds 
that a commercial speaker does not have a fundamental right “not to divulge accurate information 
regarding his services”). Information asymmetries are gaps in information that favor one party to the 
transaction. For example, cases like Zauderer assume that the lawyer has more information than the 
client about the provision of legal services. Because consumers lack the ability to share and retrieve 
information, the market will not squeeze out incompetent or unscrupulous practitioners. Regulation 
attempts to correct this market failure. Cary Coglianese et al., Seeking Truth for Power: Informational 
Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 277, 280 (2004) (“[I]nformation asymmetries 
between producers and consumers [are] widely accepted as justifying certain kinds of regulatory 
interventions.”). 
 2. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (discussing the 
importance of “free trade in ideas” which government cannot monopolize). 
 3. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Teaching Enron, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1139, 1151 (2005) (discussing the 
lack of transparency in accounting of some corporations).  
 4. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
Congress could prohibit financial contributions to foreign terrorist groups because such contributions 
may support both violent and nonviolent purposes), cert. denied sub nom., Humanitarian Law Project 
v. Ashcroft, 532 U.S. 904 (2001). 
 5. 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724–30 (2010). The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 933 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 6. Wadie E. Said, The Material Support Prosecution and Foreign Policy, 86 Ind. L.J. 543, 588–92 
(2011) (criticizing the statute’s rationale and implementation); Timothy Zick, The First Amendment in 
Transborder Perspective: Toward a More Cosmopolitan Orientation, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 941, 995–96 
(2011) [hereinafter Zick, The First Amendment in Transborder Perspective] (arguing that the HLP 
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Breyer fueled this argument with a dissent, joined by two of his 
colleagues, which criticized Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the 
majority as based on speculation, not principle.7 Others have suggested 
that the decision was a pragmatic adaptation to conflicting values.8 The 
merits of the debate inform our understanding of free speech, terrorism, 
and the role of foreign affairs. 
This Article views HLP as a hybrid form of scrutiny that limits 
terrorist groups’ exploitation of information asymmetries, while 
preserving safe harbors for advocacy that challenges government policy. 
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court in HLP navigated between 
the opposing information gaps of First Amendment doctrine. On one 
side is the asymmetry between seller and consumer that dominates 
commercial speech cases: Sellers typically know more about the products 
they sell, and the government can prevent deceptive speech that 
exacerbates that asymmetry. The other side features the gap between 
government and citizen that figures so prominently in cases involving 
political speech: Public officials know more about the workings of 
government than citizens do, and protecting political speech help citizens 
close the gap. In addressing these asymmetries, Chief Justice Roberts 
distinguished speech in agency relationships with designated foreign 
terrorist organizations (“DFTOs”),9 and the expression of ideas outside 
such relationships.10 The former are subject to “rules of the road.” These 
rules promote cooperation between parties and reduce asymmetries in 
 
decision took “provincial” view that unduly discounted the value of transborder exchange of ideas); 
Timothy Zick, Territoriality and the First Amendment: Free Speech at—and Beyond—Our Borders, 
85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1543, 1579 (2010) (expressing concern about First Amendment consequences 
of the statute’s enforcement); Leading Cases, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 179, 259, 264–69 (2010) (critiquing the 
Court’s language and reasoning). Professor David Cole of the Georgetown University Law Center, 
who led the legal challenge to the provision, has also been a salient scholarly critic. See David Cole, 
The Roberts Court v. Free Speech, N.Y. Rev. Books, Aug. 19, 2010, at 81; see also David Cole, Enemy 
Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism 60–62 (2003) 
[hereinafter Cole, Enemy Aliens] (arguing that the ban on material support to terrorist groups 
violates First Amendment rights); David Cole, Hanging with the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorism, 
and the Right of Association, 1999 Sup. Ct. Rev. 203, 246–50. For additional criticism of the material-
support statutes, see Raneta Lawson Mack & Michael J. Kelly, Equal Justice in the Balance: 
America’s Legal Responses to the Emerging Terrorist Threat 208–10 (2004). 
 7. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2735–36 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens, 
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined the Chief Justice’s opinion, while Justices Ginsburg and 
Sotomayor joined Justice Breyer’s dissent. Id. at 2712 (majority opinion). 
 8. See Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable Pragmatism of 
the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 Ind. L.J. 1, 71 (2011); see also William D. Araiza, Citizens 
United, Stevens, and Humanitarian Law Project: First Amendment Rules and Standards in Three Acts, 
40 Stetson L. Rev. 821, 830–31 (2011); cf. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 Yale L.J. 
978, 1010 n.150 (2011) (arguing that the Court’s safe harbor for domestic groups safeguards free 
expression). 
 9. DFTOs are designated by the Secretary of State. See infra notes 166–68 and accompanying text.  
 10. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2721–22. 
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information that undermine trust. In contrast, the expression of ideas 
outside such relationships receives a safe harbor. 
An unexpected parallel emerges in case law on agency relationships, 
including those between lawyer and client. Since clients can use a lawyer 
to gain another’s trust and then defect, courts have structured lawyer-
client relationships to diminish this risk.11 On occasion, this focus on 
agents following the rules of the road spills over from commercial to 
political speech: Courts require lawyers for a party in litigation to refrain 
from prejudicial pretrial publicity, even if the lawyer is truthful and 
addresses matters of public concern, because courts worry that 
laypersons who comprise the jury pool will not adequately discount the 
lawyer’s remarks.12 Courts also give lawyers a safe harbor by permitting 
public remarks by lawyers not involved in the matter.13 These rules guard 
against both lawyer-created information asymmetries and gaps in public 
knowledge about the functioning of the justice system. 
The uses and abuses of agency have been a particular concern in the 
domain of foreign affairs. Establishing rules of the road to regulate 
foreign agents has been a core mission since the dawn of American 
constitutionalism. The Framers recognized that the geographic, cultural, 
and political gap between American and foreign states would compound 
information asymmetries: American officials lacked reliable information 
about the designs of other nations, and other nations lacked accurate 
information about us.14 The Foreign Gifts clause15 emerged from this 
concern,16 as did Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation.17 In the 
twentieth century, Congress passed the Foreign Agents Registration Act 
to require disclosure of the source of foreign political propaganda.18 To 
limit revenue to foreign powers like Cuba whose ventures were adverse 
 
 11. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1336 (2010) 
(upholding disclosure and advice mandates that communicate adverse consequences of bankruptcy to 
prospective petitioners, and therefore also reassure creditors that petitioners are not abusing access to 
relief); cf. Renee Newman Knake, Attorney Advice and the First Amendment, 68 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 
639, 674–85 (2011) (arguing for more robust protections for attorney speech).  
 12. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991); cf. W. Bradley Wendel, Free 
Speech for Lawyers, 28 Hastings Const. L.Q. 305, 400 (2001) (discussing the rationale for limiting 
pretrial publicity). 
 13. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1062 (noting that the provision at issue concerned the attorney’s 
representation of a client in a pending case). 
 14. Cf. H. Jefferson Powell, The Founders and the President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs, 
40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1471, 1511–27 (1999) (discussing John Marshall’s perspective on foreign 
affairs). For further discussion of Marshall’s view, see infra notes 102–09 and accompanying text. 
 15. U.S. Const. art I, § 9, cl. 8. 
 16. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 948 n.51 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 17. See Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism 336–41 (1993). 
 18. Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, ch. 327, 52 Stat. 631 (codified as amended at 22 
U.S.C. §§ 611–621 (2010)); see Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 467 (1987). 
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to U.S. interests, Congress and the executive branch enacted travel bans 
with exceptions for scholars, journalists, and human rights groups.19 
However, fears about information asymmetries in the foreign arena 
have also impinged on the expression of ideas. This darker strand 
appeared early with the Alien and Sedition Acts, which criminalized 
speech critical of the government.20 It surfaced again in repression of 
anarchists, in arrest and deportation of opponents to American 
intervention in World War I,21 and in the blacklisting and loyalty 
investigations of the Cold War.22 Such measures widen the knowledge 
gap between citizens and government. 
Courts have reviewed these measures in terms that echo the division 
of commercial and political speech. Measures such as travel restrictions 
and disclosure requirements have elicited less demanding scrutiny.23 
However, starting with the Cold War, the courts have constructed a safe 
harbor for political opinions, initially through the canon that counsels 
interpreting statutes to avoid constitutional questions.24 
Congress’s 1996 bar on material support of groups designated by the 
Secretary of State as foreign terrorist organizations (DFTOs),25 passed 
after the Oklahoma City bombing, posed a challenge to this neat division 
of judicial approaches. Congress acted because it saw terrorist groups 
such as Hamas26 as quintessential defecting parties with no respect for 
 
 19. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1984). 
 20. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime from the Sedition Act of 
1798 to the War on Terrorism 36 (2004). 
 21. Cf. Paul L. Murphy, World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties in the United States 
75–85 (1979) (describing wartime censorship and targeting of immigrants who were viewed as 
subversives). 
 22. See Cole, Enemy Aliens, supra note 6, at 129–53; Robert Justin Goldstein, American 
Blacklist: The Attorney General’s List of Subversive Organizations 190–210 (2008) (discussing 
listing of domestic organizations and restrictions imposed on those who had participated in these 
groups). Targeting of political opponents also figured in some moves by the Bush administration. See 
Peter Margulies, Law’s Detour: Justice Displaced in the Bush Administration 44, 127, 131–34 
(2010) (discussing the administration’s efforts to target dissenters and political opponents, and the 
firing of federal prosecutors who refused to acquiesce in these goals). 
 23. See, e.g., Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1336 (2010) 
(upholding disclosure requirements); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15 (1965) (upholding travel 
restrictions). 
 24. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129–30 (1958) (avoiding the constitutional question by 
holding that Congress had not authorized singling out the illustrator Rockwell Kent for denial of a 
passport based on his expression of unpopular political ideas). 
 25. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 303, 110 Stat. 
1214, 1250–53 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2010)). Material support is defined as “any 
property, tangible or intangible, or service, including financial services . . . training, [and] expert advice 
or assistance.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2010). For background on the Act, see Robert M. Chesney, 
The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 Harv. J. on Legis. 
1, 12–18 (2005). 
 26. See Matthew Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad 135 
(2006). Hamas, which takes its name from an acronym for Islamic Resistance Movement, was founded 
in 1987. The group’s charter calls for destruction of the State of Israel and establishment of a religious 
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global rules of the road.27 Like corporate officials who engage in 
misconduct within the U.S., DFTOs are bad accountants. Courts have 
repeatedly applied intermediate scrutiny to uphold the bar on financial 
assistance to DFTOs because DFTOs that accept contributions for a 
school or hospital can funnel those resources to instrumentalities of 
violence, or free up other resources for violent goals.28 
However, DFTOs’ bad accounting goes further, because DFTOs 
exploit human as well as financial capital. They use agents just as bad 
actors in private law do: to maximize their returns for defection from 
cooperative agreements. For example, DFTOs use truces as tactical 
devices to refurbish their weapons stocks and plan an expedient 
resumption of violence.29 An outside negotiator for a DFTO, whatever 
her intent, functions like a lawyer in a financing agreement where the 
borrower takes the money and runs: as a reputation engineer who draws 
down her goodwill for the benefit of a defecting party.30 Capitalizing on 
these asymmetries, DFTOs routinely use truces for tactical purposes and 
manipulate international law by mobilizing ostensibly neutral sites such 
as refugee camps.31 Curbing this activity requires limits on a narrow band 
of speech: communication between an agent and a DFTO on putatively 
nonviolent matters such as the timing and negotiation of truces.32 
Regulation of this kind clearly calls for more than the intermediate 
scrutiny applied to curbs on financial capital. The hybrid scrutiny that the 
Court employed to uphold the regulation of human capital in HLP 
responded to this need. 
The Court held that Congress could prohibit assisting DFTOs in 
negotiations and in training them in the use of international law.33 The 
opinion stressed the pervasive information asymmetries in the realm of 
 
state on land currently comprising Israel proper, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Hamas seeks to 
supplant the more secular Palestinian Authority as the representative of the Palestinian people. To 
achieve these goals, it has implemented a coordinated strategy involving political activity, social 
welfare programs, and violence against both Israelis and moderate Palestinians. Id. at 8, 117. 
 27. Cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2725 (2010) (“[T]errorist groups 
systematically conceal their [violent] activities behind charitable, social, and political fronts.” (quoting 
Levitt, supra note 26, at 2–3)).  
 28. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A]ll material 
support given to such organizations aids their unlawful goals.”), cert. denied sub nom., Humanitarian 
Law Project v. Ashcroft, 532 U.S. 904 (2001); see also Kilburn v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, 376 F.3d 1123, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (refusing to require that financial assistance be 
directly traceable to a terrorist act because money is fungible). 
 29. Cf. Andrew H. Kydd & Barbara F. Walter, The Strategies of Terrorism, 31 Int’l Security 49, 
72–75 (2006) (explaining incentives for violent extremists to undermine peace negotiations). 
 30. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 
94 Yale L.J. 239, 253–57 (1984) (discussing lawyers as “transaction cost engineers”). 
 31. See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2729–30.  
 32. Id. at 2722–23, 2729. 
 33. Id. at 2731. 
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foreign affairs.34 Whatever the intent of the agent who aided the DFTO, 
Chief Justice Roberts explained, Congress has a compelling interest in 
regulating this exploitation of agency relationships.35 Moreover, Congress 
throughout its history has sent signals that trigger reciprocity with allies 
or neutral powers.36 The material-support statute serves that purpose by 
limiting agency relationships with DFTOs that prey on another country’s 
civilians.37 
A hybrid model that regulates principal-agent political speech must 
echo the pretrial-publicity paradigm in providing safe harbors for 
questioning government policy. Acknowledging this imperative, Chief 
Justice Roberts’s opinion narrowly defined speech-related material 
support as entailing a close degree of interaction with the DFTO, akin to 
an agency relationship.38 Only a narrowly defined nexus leaves 
constitutionally adequate space for independent advocacy, journalism, 
scholarship, mediation, and human rights monitoring. Finally, the 
avoidance canon also requires protection of lawyers who assist in 
challenging a terrorist group’s designation and who provide legal advice 
reasonably related to that objective.39 By crafting a hybrid model that 
targets a limited precinct of principal-agent speech while creating safe 
harbors for most expressive content, the Court addressed the challenge 
of terrorist groups’ bad accounting and preserved constitutional values. 
Like any hybrid, HLP sacrifices doctrinal elegance for pragmatic 
results. The more streamlined doctrinal course would have been either to 
strike down the statute under strict scrutiny or to uphold the bar on 
agency relationships as regulating conduct rather than speech. However, 
each of these ostensibly smoother routes had its own perils. Striking 
down the statute would have permitted a DFTO to attract more financial 
support with facile gestures toward reform. Conversely, upholding the 
statute under intermediate scrutiny might have emboldened the 
government to enact even more aggressive measures. The Court’s 
approach reduced the impact of information asymmetries favoring 
DFTOs without expanding the gap between citizen and government. In 
 
 34. Id. at 2727–28. 
 35. Id. at 2725–27. 
 36. See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118–21 (1804) 
(interpreting the statute to comply with the duty under international law to respect neutrals’ 
property). 
 37. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2726–27 (discussing the importance of the U.S.’s 
signals to countries, such as Turkey, which face daunting problems with terrorist violence). 
 38. Id. at 2721–22. 
 39. Cf. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543–48 (2001) (invalidating restrictions on 
funding for legal challenges to welfare restrictions). This Article counters scholars who have suggested 
that HLP targets legal representation. See, e.g., Knake, supra note 11, at 656–67 (expressing concern 
about HLP’s implications for lawyers); Margaret Tarkington, Attorney Speech and the Right to an 
Impartial Adjudicator, 30 Rev. Litig. 849, 877–78 (2011). 
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opting for flexibility, the Court took a page from its past practice, which 
often stressed solicitude for disadvantaged groups over precise placement 
in doctrinal pigeonholes.40 
Unfortunately, the Court’s flexibility turned into imprecision on 
three issues: (1) the deference owed to the government, (2) the public 
interest in curbing the “legitimacy” of DFTOs, and (3) the vagueness of 
the statute as applied to the plaintiffs.41 First, Chief Justice Roberts’s 
opinion seemed studied in its deference to governmental sources.42 
Ample independent reports cite DFTOs’ chronic defections.43 The 
Court’s reluctance to cite those independent reports prompted an 
unnecessary expansion of deference. 
In addition, the opinion needlessly roiled First Amendment doctrine 
by failing to clearly distinguish between functional and ideational senses 
of lending “legitimacy” to DFTOs. If Congress could silence any speaker 
who enhanced a DFTO’s legitimacy, its power would have no stopping 
point, as Justice Breyer noted in dissent.44 Chief Justice Roberts viewed 
legitimacy in a narrower functional sense, as an advantage in fundraising 
and recruitment yielded by an agent.45 But use of the term “legitimacy” 
confused the issue. 
Finally, the majority failed to explain clearly why the statutory term, 
“training,” which Congress defined as the teaching of a “specific skill,”46 
was not vague as applied to the plaintiffs’ goal of teaching DFTOs about 
the application of international law to the resolution of disputes. The 
majority could have been making a functional argument that such 
teaching involves concrete interactions with the DFTO about its core 
activities, such as ongoing violence that the group might wish to 
rationalize with a strained reading of international law.47 However, the 
majority could also have been making a substantive point about the 
 
 40. See Cass R. Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 53–60 (1996) 
(discussing a case-by-case approach to inequality in decisions such as Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996), in which the Court struck down a state constitutional provision that barred the enactment of 
measures remedying discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation); cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
Implementing the Constitution 45–55 (2001) (discussing institutional concerns, such as manageable 
standards, that influence role of doctrine in particular cases); Richard H. Pildes, The 
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 29, 86–99 (2004) (arguing that fixating 
on doctrine can frustrate the larger cause of political reform). 
 41. Following the Court, I use the term “plaintiffs” to describe the individuals and organizations 
challenging § 2339B. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2716. 
 42. See id. at 2725. 
 43. See Kydd & Walter, supra note 29, at 72–75. 
 44. See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2736 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 45. Id. at 2725–27 (majority opinion) (citing the government affidavit ten times within three 
pages, while citing only two independent sources). 
 46. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(2) (2010). 
 47. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2729. Chief Justice Roberts clearly contemplated this 
broader sense with reference to other activities that the statute prohibits. Id. at 2722 (“[T]he term 
‘service’ [means activity] performed in coordination with, or at the direction of a [DFTO].”). 
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relative complexity of certain topics.48 In an age when the Internet offers 
profuse knowledge about any subject, a substantive test of complexity 
seems both anachronistic and difficult to apply. The Court should have 
recognized that effective rules of the road require attention to detail. 
The Article is divided into five Parts. Part I discusses agency as a 
double-edged sword that can promote cooperation or facilitate defection. 
It then analyzes information asymmetries as a basis for regulating the 
legal profession, where the overlap between commercial and political 
speech has challenged doctrinal coherence. Part II recounts the history of 
American concern with the information asymmetries exploited by 
foreign agents, and the sometimes blurred line since the Founding Era 
between enacting rules of the road and chilling free expression. Part III 
outlines Congress’s effort in § 2339B to combat information asymmetries 
that assist DFTOs. Because DFTOs use both financial and human capital 
to raise funds and boost recruitment, addressing these information 
asymmetries requires the regulation of agency relationships with DFTOs. 
Part III also addresses the flaws in the majority’s handling of deference 
and legitimacy. Part IV focuses on the safe harbor that the Court 
constructed for independent advocacy. It suggests that both the logic of 
the Court’s opinion and the avoidance of constitutional questions require 
a safe harbor that includes journalism, scholarship, mediation, and 
human rights monitoring, as well as legal representation. Finally, Part V 
takes a step back to discuss the virtues of the Court’s hybrid approach. It 
argues that the ex ante arguments the Court adopted to justify the 
content regulation here have a strong pedigree in both constitutional law 
generally and First Amendment jurisprudence. Moreover, doctrinal tests 
are only one source of signaling at the Court’s disposal; sometimes 
departing from doctrine is the most pragmatic way to accommodate 
conflicting values. 
I.  Information Asymmetries and Rules of the Road 
in the Regulation of Lawyers 
Understanding the relationship of cooperation, defection, and 
agency in private law facilitates understanding of Congress’s efforts to 
bar DFTOs’ exploitation of human capital. Cooperation on any level 
requires compliance with formal or informal norms that we can call 
“rules of the road.” Compliance often hinges on the work of agents, who 
owe duties of loyalty and confidentiality to their principals.49 Agents, 
 
 48. Id. at 2720–21 (asserting without explanation that teaching international law imparts “specific 
skill,” not “general knowledge,” under § 2339A(b)(2) and therefore violates the statutory bar on 
“training”). 
 49. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 14N cmt. a (1958) (“[Agents] are fiduciaries; they 
owe to the principal . . . loyalty and obedience.”); see also Dubbs v. Stribling & Assocs., 752 N.E.2d 
850, 852 (N.Y. 2001) (holding that a real estate broker as agent owes duties of loyalty and obedience to 
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including lawyers, can promote cooperation among parties looking to 
make a deal. However, agents also can help one party realize unilateral 
gains through defection. Either way, the human capital provided by the 
agent can exceed the value of financial capital.50 After a brief example of 
the use and misuse of agents, this Part discusses how promoting 
compliance with rules of the road has driven the regulation of lawyers. 
A. The Use and Abuse of Agency: A Private Law Story 
Illustrating the value of agency, Ronald Gilson has referred to 
lawyers as “transaction cost engineers” who tailor deals to address 
asymmetries in information between the parties.51 For example, 
purchasers in many sophisticated transactions rely on an opinion drafted 
by the seller’s counsel on the entity’s legal and financial condition.52 The 
opinion letter leverages the lawyer’s reputation to promote cooperation 
and mutual trust.53 
The role of the seller’s agent changes dramatically if the seller, with 
or without the agent’s knowledge, plans to defect from this cooperative 
framework to achieve a one-sided benefit. A defecting party uses the 
agent’s reputation, with or without the agent’s knowledge, to exploit the 
purchaser’s information deficit. In the opinion-letter context, for 
example, the seller might conceal material information from the lawyer,54 
or induce the lawyer to hide such data from the other party. An agent 
who knowingly colludes with the defecting party, or herself is deceived, 
does not reduce information asymmetries, but instead compounds them. 
 
a seller); Rivkin v. Century 21 Teran Realty LLC, 887 N.E.2d 1113, 1114 (N.Y. 2008); see also N.Y. 
Real Prop. Law § 443 (2011) (prescribing a standard form that explains to the seller that the agent has 
“duties . . . [including] undivided loyalty, confidentiality, [and] obedience”). 
 50. See Gary S. Beckker, Human Capital 15 (3d ed. 1993).  
 51. See Gilson, supra note 30, at 263–67; cf. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing 
Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 509, 513 
(1994) (noting incentives for lawyers, as “repeat players” in the litigation process, to cooperate, along 
with countervailing incentives to prolong disagreements). 
 52. See Gilson, supra note 30, at 275. 
 53. See id. at 275–76 (“Because reducing the cost of information necessary to the correct pricing 
of the transaction is beneficial to both buyer and seller, determination of the matters to be covered by 
the opinion of counsel for seller should be in large measure a cooperative, rather than a competitive, 
opportunity.” (footnote omitted)). 
 54. Legal ethics rules guard against a principal’s deception by authorizing the lawyer to disclose in 
certain circumstances information necessary to prevent substantial financial harm to others. See 
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6(b)(2) (2011); see also David McGowan, Why Not Try the 
Carrot? A Modest Proposal to Grant Immunity to Lawyers Who Disclose Client Financial Misconduct, 
92 Calif. L. Rev. 1825, 1848–49 (2004) (discussing the problem of clients who deceive lawyers 
regarding transactions with third parties). 
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B. Reconciling the Regulation of Lawyers with the Rule of Law 
When government seeks to regulate agents to reduce asymmetries 
in information, courts have tended to defer to government efforts. This 
deference drives the commercial speech jurisprudence,55 including much 
of the regulation of the legal profession.56 In contrast, when lawyers 
challenge government policies, courts worry that regulation of such 
advocacy will compound asymmetries in information between the 
government and the public.57 Classifying such litigation as political 
speech, courts review government regulation more rigorously.58 Some 
cases, however, hint at a hybrid of approaches from the commercial and 
political speech contexts. In these hybrid cases, courts extend the 
commercial speech rationale to other settings where a speaker has a 
special relationship that is likely to engender an information gap. Courts, 
however, tailor regulation, demanding a safe harbor for speakers who are 
free from this taint.59 
In the regulation of the legal profession, regulation of deceptive 
speech serves two purposes. First, it addresses asymmetries in 
information between lawyer and client. Second, viewed ex ante, 
prohibiting deceptive speech and mandating disclosure resolve 
collective-action problems by signaling cooperation on rules of the road 
governing specialized forums. Consider Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, 
P.A. v. United States, in which the Supreme Court upheld the provisions 
 
 55. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); Thomas D. 
Morgan, The Vanishing American Lawyer 77 n.21 (2010) (discussing the rationale of Zauderer and 
other cases upholding First Amendment protection for lawyer advertising). On the theoretical basis 
for regulating marketing to reduce information asymmetries, see Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, 
and Loyalty: Further Reflections and a Survey of Recent Contributions, in Essays in Trespassing: 
Economics to Politics and Beyond 213, 219 (1981) (noting the importance of transparency when 
consumers of information confront difficulties in assessing information’s value or reliability). 
 56. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal Profession: 
Constraints on Lawyers’ First Amendment Rights, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 569, 584–87 (1998) (suggesting 
that government can limit some speech by lawyers as it regulates speech that government enables 
through sponsorship or employment); cf. Wendel, supra note 12, at 373–82 (suggesting that much 
regulation of lawyers stems from a concern about transparency in the marketing and functioning of the 
legal system, but that the conflict between a lawyer’s roles as an advocate for clients and an officer of 
the court complicates a comprehensive theory of lawyers as First Amendment actors). 
 57. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 546 (2001) (finding that restrictions on 
federally funded lawyers’ challenges to welfare-reform legislation would “draw lines around [the 
program of legal assistance] to exclude from litigation those arguments and theories Congress finds 
unacceptable but which by their nature are within the province of the courts to consider”). 
 58. Id. at 543–48 (striking down a bar on funding for legal challenges to welfare restrictions); cf. 
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1335, 1337, 1338 n.5 (2010) 
(construing the Bankruptcy Code narrowly to prohibit attorney advice that a client incur prefiling debt 
with the specific intent to avoid repayment, even where the parties conceded that lower scrutiny 
consistent with regulation of commercial speech applied, and noting that broader construction would 
not vindicate Congress’ intent and would “seriously undermine the attorney-client relationship”). 
 59. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991) (upholding “narrow and 
necessary limitations” on the speech of lawyers before and during trials in which they are participating). 
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of the Bankruptcy Code that govern the marketing and content of for-
profit legal advice.60 The statute requires a lawyer who assists clients in 
filing for bankruptcy to identify her firm as a “debt relief agency”61 that 
helps the client obtain such relief through a bankruptcy filing.62 In 
addition, the statute bars a lawyer from advising a client to “incur more 
debt in contemplation of” bankruptcy.63 
In upholding the disclosure provisions, the Milavetz Court relied on 
the higher deference accorded to regulation of commercial speech, but 
also attributed to Congress a concern for the proper functioning of 
bankruptcy in the economic system. The Court cast lawyers as Gilson’s 
transaction cost engineers, building a floor of goodwill between debtors 
and creditors. The provisions at issue promoted mutual understandings 
on rules of the road, even though each side also has divergent interests.64 
The disclosure requirements provided some assurance to creditors that 
lawyers will not try to obtain more business by painting bankruptcy in an 
unduly rosy light.65 Creditors concerned that lawyers are promising 
clients pie in the sky results could have responded with measures that 
disadvantaged debtors as a group. For example, creditors could have 
instructed their own counsel to be unduly obfuscatory in opposing 
individual bankruptcy petitions, viewing such tactics as a necessary 
substitute for the gatekeeping that a debtor’s lawyer should perform. 
Creditors also could have become stingier with credit to compensate for 
a higher risk of abuse. These unintended consequences would have 
ratcheted up mistrust between debtor and creditor, making each side 
worse off. 
Similar “rules of the road” concerns drove the Court’s upholding of 
the provisions that limited advice on incurring debt. Advising a client to 
exploit a pending filing by making purely elective purchases would 
constitute gaming the system.66 Such advice would harm the debtor by 
prompting an adverse ruling in bankruptcy court.67 However, the Court 
narrowed the provision appreciably by reading it to permit advice that a 
 
 60. 130 S. Ct. at 1335–39. 
 61. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A) (2010). 
 62. 11 U.S.C. § 528(a)(4) (2010). 
 63. 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4) (2010). For more on Milavetz, see Renee Newman Knake, The Supreme 
Court’s Increased Attention to the Law of Lawyering: Mere Coincidence or Something More?, 59 Am. 
U. L. Rev. 1499, 1508–12 (2010); see also Knake, supra note 11 at 648–52; Margaret Tarkington, A 
First Amendment Theory for Protecting Attorney Speech 5–9 (Aug. 31, 2010) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1669617. 
 64. See Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1341. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1336 (citing Conrad v. Pender, 289 U.S. 472, 478 (1933)) (noting that the payment of 
attorney’s fees by a debtor may be scrutinized to prevent a debtor from “deal[ing] too liberally with 
his property,” that is, paying more than necessary for legal services to avoid having assets go to 
creditors). 
 67. Id. at 1337. 
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client incur debt “for a valid purpose,” such as a loan for living 
expenses.68 The Court suggested that a broader interpretation of the 
statute would unduly interfere with the attorney-client relationship and 
impair bankruptcy relief.69 
Asymmetries in information and the need for rules of the road 
prompt judicial deference, even outside the commercial speech context. 
In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, the Court upheld some limits on 
lawyers’ use of pretrial publicity, noting that lawyers’ “special access to 
information”70 heightened the risk of prejudice to the jury pool.71 The 
Court stressed the legal system’s rules of the road, which focus juries on 
“evidence and argument in open court”72 and shield the fact finder from 
information that is privileged or prejudicial.73 As “key participants in the 
criminal justice system,” lawyers have a central role in maintaining those 
rules of the road, “and the State may demand some adherence to the 
precepts of that system in regulating their speech as well as their conduct.”74 
Information asymmetries are less salient in a bench trial because a judge 
is far less susceptible to lawyer manipulation than is a jury.75 
In the pretrial-publicity setting, some limits also resolve collective-
action problems. Without a rule, litigation adversaries would engage in a 
Hobbesian war of all against all, diminishing courts’ distinctive 
institutional capital.76 Moreover, a rule saves the advocate from an 
intrapersonal collective-action problem, which pits the lawyer today 
 
 68. Id. at 1336. 
 69. Id. at 1338 n.5 (“[Broader construction] would seriously undermine the attorney-client 
relationship.”). 
 70. 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1991). 
 71. Id. at 1075. 
 72. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).  
 73. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074–76. For criticism of Gentile as a needless intrusion on political 
speech, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Silence Is Not Golden: Protecting Lawyer Speech Under the First 
Amendment, 47 Emory L.J. 859, 867–71 (1998). 
 74. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074 (emphasis added); cf. Frederick Schauer, The Speech of Law and 
the Law of Speech, 49 Ark. L. Rev. 687, 692–94 (1997) (justifying limits on pretrial publicity as a 
necessary incident of regulating advocacy in court). 
 75. Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote for the Court in ruling that courts should assess pretrial 
publicity under a lower standard of review, regarded permitting public comments in a bench trial as 
sufficient to save the limit’s constitutionality, observing that “trial judges often have access to 
inadmissible and highly prejudicial information and are presumed to be able to discount or disregard 
it.” Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1077 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy and the four Justices who 
joined him in striking down the Nevada limit as void for vagueness regarded the exclusion of bench 
trials as necessary, but not sufficient, to save the measure. Id. at 1036–38 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) 
(conceding that some limits on pretrial publicity were appropriate, but asserting that the voir dire 
process is often adequate to guard against prejudice). 
 76. See Patterson, 205 U.S at 462 (“The theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached 
in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside 
influence, whether a private talk or public print.”); cf. Wendel, supra note 12, at 400 (discussing the 
rationale for regulating pretrial publicity). 
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against her future self.77 In the short term, pretrial doldrums may tempt 
lawyers to put much of their case before the public.78 In the longer term, 
however, detailed statements on the public record may damage the 
client’s prospects by locking the lawyer into a strategy that does not fit 
changed circumstances. A lawyer who cannot deliver at trial on public 
statements will endure push-back from the jury at her client’s expense. 
However, when a trial is pending, the lawyer may not sufficiently 
consider that risk. The rule signals to lawyers that they should steer clear 
of temptation.79 
Yet another facet of this relational content-regulation model is the 
provision of a safe harbor for those outside the relationship that the law 
seeks to regulate. In the pretrial-publicity setting, for example, attorneys 
not involved in the lawsuit are free to comment on any aspect of the 
case.80 This safe harbor has a number of purposes. First, it ensures that 
the public will get to hear a wide range of substantive positions, which 
will overlap with positions that regulated parties might articulate. The 
safe harbor ensures that neither the government nor a private individual 
or entity can keep particular positions out of the public square. The safe 
harbor also has a healthy ex ante effect on government: If the 
government could categorically bar all attorneys from speaking out 
regarding possible injustice in a criminal prosecution, it would have a 
greater incentive to target those who have posed a substantive challenge 
to government policies.81 Allowing independent speech reduces the 
government’s incentive. 
 
 77. An intrapersonal collective-action problem is one “in which the costs and benefits, for a 
particular person, of engaging in an activity change dramatically over time.” Cass R. Sunstein, 
Preferences and Politics, 20 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3, 26 (1991); see also Daniel Read, Intertemporal Choice, 
in Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making 424, 428–29 (Derek J. Koehler & Nigel 
Harvey eds., 2004) (arguing that individuals tend to prefer a “smaller-sooner reward”); David Laibson, 
Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. Econ. 443, 443–45 (1997) (arguing that people 
employ “commitment mechanisms” such as insurance policies or savings plans to compensate for the 
tendency to unduly discount the future); George Loewenstein et al., Projection Bias in Predicting 
Future Utility, 118 Q.J. Econ. 1209, 1209–12 (2003) (analyzing errors in discounting over time); 
cf. Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules of Union 
Organizing, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 655, 681 (2010) (arguing that undue discounting of long-term gains may 
prejudice attempts at unionization, which often involve short-term risk and delayed gains). 
 78. See Peter Margulies, The Detainees’ Dilemma: The Virtues and Vices of Advocacy Strategies in 
the War on Terror, 57 Buff. L. Rev. 347, 385–88 (2009) (discussing tactical risks of pretrial publicity). 
See generally Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, Installment 
One: Broadening the Role of Corporate Attorneys, 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1259 (2009) (analyzing the 
interaction of legal and public relations strategies). 
 79. Cf. Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 18–20 (2000) (discussing the importance of 
signaling in overcoming information asymmetries and promoting trust). 
 80. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1062 (1991). 
 81. See In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 632 (1959) (“[P]ermissible criticism [of systemic injustice] may 
as well be made to a lay audience as to a professional [one].”); see also In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 647 
(1985) (finding that a single incident of rudeness in a letter complaining about inadequate 
compensation in court-assigned criminal defense cases does not merit suspension from practice). But 
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As the importance of safe harbors demonstrates, lawyers also serve 
as agents in the cause of constitutionalism itself. Constitutionalism is a 
coordinated game premised on the polity’s collective understanding that 
shortsighted decisions can distort abiding values.82 Alexander Hamilton 
famously remarked that elected officials were often subject to the 
“effects of occasional ill humors in the society.”83 These effects could 
prompt “serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.”84 
Under a constitutional order, majorities agree to limit some short-term 
choices, such as measures that could oppress minorities. In return, 
majorities receive protection from long-term shifts in the polity that 
could limit their rights. Lawyers actualize this bargain, integrating short- 
and long-term perspectives of parties to public law disputes, just as they 
do for private actors. If government seeks a short-term payoff through 
oppression of minorities, lawyers seek relief in the courts.85 This role 
reduces the influence of short-term perspectives that can impel 
defections from the rule of law. Without lawyers performing this role, 
transaction costs could be far higher, as only popular upheavals86 could 
overturn oppressive legislation. Government change would become a 
volatile series of “pendular swings”87 rather than an exercise in 
 
see Margaret Tarkington, The Truth Be Damned: The First Amendment, Attorney Speech, and Judicial 
Reputation, 97 Geo. L.J. 1567, 1587–1600 (2009) (arguing that courts have impaired public discussion 
of the legal system through sanctions against attorneys for allegedly disrespectful extrajudicial 
comments); Margaret Tarkington, A Free Speech Right to Impugn Judicial Integrity in Court 
Proceedings, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 363, 363–71 (2010) (same). 
 82. See Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, 
Public Law, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1791, 1830–35 (2009) (discussing premises of constitutionalism); cf. 
supra note 77 (discussing flaws in individuals’ discounting of risks and benefits over time). 
 83. See The Federalist No. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 84. Id. at 469. 
 85. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543–49 (2001) (striking down limits on 
government-funded legal representation in challenges to welfare reform); cf. Knake, supra note 11, at 
664–72 (discussing the lawyer’s role in challenging violations of constitutional rights); Kathryn A. 
Sabbeth, Towards an Understanding of Litigation as Expression: Lessons from Guantanamo, 44 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 1487, 1495–1503 (2011) (same). Lawyers arguably serve a similar function within 
government agencies by arguing for the observance of constitutional norms. Unfortunately, the Court 
has declined to protect this type of lawyer speech, defining it as nonpublic and within government’s 
ambit as an employer. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421–23 (2006); see also Orly Lobel, 
Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping Obligations, 97 Calif. L. Rev. 
433, 451–55 (2009) (critiquing Garcetti as inhibiting dialog and dissent within government agencies). 
 86. See Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial 
Review 136–38 (2004) (discussing the Federalists’ view of the role of the judiciary); cf. Larry 
Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1594, 1599–1615 
(2005) (reviewing Kramer, supra) (assessing arguments against constitutional interpretation by people 
and elected officials); Jared A. Goldstein, The Tea Party Movement and the Perils of Popular 
Originalism, 53 Ariz. L. Rev. 827, 831–42 (2011) (discussing the images and rhetoric of 
constitutionalism in Tea Party commentary); Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. Ill. 
L. Rev. 1185, 1204 (explaining that in the Founding Era dispute over the Alien and Sedition Acts, 
“constitutional meaning was hammered out informally through political contestation”).  
 87. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008) (striking down habeas-stripping provisions 
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deliberation and dialogue. Carving out a role for lawyers representing 
alleged victims of government overreaching thus fulfills crucial 
constitutional purposes. 
II.  A Perennial Concern: Foreign Agents and American History 
Governmental efforts to limit U.S. residents’ agency relationships 
with foreign powers have a long history, going back to the enactment of 
the Constitution itself. The Framers worried about asymmetries of 
information regarding the intentions of foreign powers and signaled 
America’s desire for comity in the fluid domain of foreign affairs.88 Our 
history since the Founding Era has continued to reflect this concern. 
However, efforts by the Framers and their successors to limit foreign 
influence have on occasion triggered government aggrandizement and 
suppression of independent advocacy. Courts since the Founding Era 
have used the avoidance canon to curb government overreaching. 
A. Foreign Agents and the Founding Era 
Concern about the opacity of foreign influence drove the drafting 
and enactment of two constitutional provisions: the residency 
requirements for election to the House of Representatives and the 
Foreign Gifts Clause. The Framers differed only on the identity of the 
foreign power that posed the greatest threat. Jeffersonian Republicans 
cited British plots.89 Federalists feared France.90 Each side noted its lack 
of knowledge of foreign powers’ intentions.91 
Pushing for a residency clause that would limit the influence of 
foreign nationals on the legislative branch, George Mason of Virginia 
warned that a “rich foreign Nation, for example Great Britain, might 
send over her tools who might bribe their way into the Legislature for 
insidious purposes.”92 Heeding Mason’s caution, the Framers required 
that at the time of election a member of the House of Representatives be 
a U.S. citizen for seven years and an “inhabitant” of the state that 
included his district.93 
Even more concrete concerns about foreign influence impelled the 
enactment of the Foreign Gifts Clause.94 Delegates at the constitutional 
 
of the Military Commissions Act of 2006). 
 88. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 948 n.51 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 341, 393 n.245 (2009)). 
 89. See Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 17, at 441–49 (detailing Jeffersonians’ opposition to the 
Jay Treaty with Britain, which would have increased Britain’s economic influence). 
 90. Id. at 360 (discussing Hamilton’s concern about the French Revolution). 
 91. See infra notes 92–106 and accompanying text. 
 92. Notes of James Madison (Aug. 8, 1787), in 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 
at 216 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) (recording Mason’s arguments). 
 93. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. 
 94. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
Margulies_63-HLJ-455 (Do Not Delete) 1/24/2012 6:08 PM 
472  HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:455 
convention in Philadelphia and at state ratifying conventions feared that 
gratuities from foreign heads of state could sway public officials in this 
country. Celebrated episodes fueled this anxiety: The king of France had 
given a snuffbox to Arthur Lee and a diamond-studded painting to 
Benjamin Franklin.95 Edmund Randolph, soon to become the nation’s 
first attorney general, warned that the king’s gifts had 
“disturbed . . . confidence” in the alliance between France and the U.S., 
and “diminished . . . mutual friendship, which [helped] carry us” through 
the Revolutionary War.96 The Framers hoped that a bar on foreign gifts 
would both reduce corruption among American officials and signal that 
foreign powers should deal directly and transparently with Congress and 
the President.97 
Hamilton defended key structural provisions of the Constitution on 
similar grounds. He cast the Treaty Clause as a hedge against foreign 
intrigue within the federal government. According to Hamilton, while 
“leading individuals in the Senate [could] prostitute[] their influence in 
that body as the mercenary instruments of foreign corruption” and bring 
to the floor a treaty that injured American interests, two-thirds of the 
Senate would not follow suit.98 Hamilton also defended the electoral 
college as a safeguard against foreign influence, reasoning that its 
temporary operation and shifting membership would frustrate “the 
desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our councils.”99 
During the Founding Era, concern about foreign influence often 
dovetailed with anxiety that agents of one country would entangle the 
new republic in conflicts abroad. President Washington’s Neutrality 
Proclamation signaled to warring European nations that the U.S. would 
not become a party to their conflict.100 Highly public events made such 
signaling necessary. In the most prominent example, Edmond Genet of 
France engaged in provocative acts in the course of his service as the 
French ambassador to the U.S. For example, Genet outfitted at least one 
privateer that sailed from American shores to prey on British shipping.101 
Even Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, a celebrated Francophile and 
Anglophobe, recognized the risk presented by Genet’s maneuverings. 
 
 95. See Teachout, supra note 88, at 361. 
 96. David Robertson, Debates and Other Proceedings of the Convention of Virginia 330–31 
(Richmond, Enquirer-Press 2d ed. 1805). 
 97. See id. 
 98. See The Federalist No. 66, at 406 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 99. See The Federalist No. 68, at 412–13 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
Hamilton reasoned that permitting longer membership in a continuing body could facilitate foreign 
efforts at corruption. Id. at 413. 
 100. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Story of the Neutrality Controversy: Struggling Over Presidential 
Power Outside the Courts, in Presidential Power Stories 21, 44 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis 
A. Bradley eds., 2009). 
 101. See Michael D. Ramsey, The Constitution’s Text in Foreign Affairs 78–80 (2007). 
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Fearing that American inaction in the face of Genet’s provocations 
would persuade Britain that the U.S. had joined forces with France, 
Jefferson declared that for “[U.S.] citizens . . . to commit murders and 
depredations on the members of nations at peace with us . . . [was] as 
much against the law of the land, as to murder or rob [other U.S. 
citizens].”102 
Jefferson’s foe John Marshall had even more pronounced views on 
the need for clear signals to overcome asymmetries in information 
between nations. In well-known remarks to Congress made shortly 
before his appointment as Chief Justice, Marshall recalled Genet’s 
intrigue as a paradigmatic danger to the new republic, which required an 
unequivocal response.103 Marshall also recognized that foreign powers 
seeking an advantage in conflicts abroad would not merely try to use 
America as a base, but would seek to extort money from the U.S. as the 
price for peace. Indeed, Marshall knew about this tendency first hand. 
His knowledge stemmed from service on the diplomatic mission to 
France that culminated in the notorious XYZ Affair, in which French 
officials evaded negotiating about trade policy and instead demanded 
millions in cash as the price for avoiding war.104 Summarizing the lessons 
of the new republic’s first decade under the Constitution, Marshall 
warned about the ubiquity of imperfect information about rapidly 
changing matters abroad, noting the challenge of “understand[ing] 
precisely the state of the political intercourse and connexion between the 
United States and foreign nations.”105 
Importantly, Marshall warned that this asymmetry was reciprocal: 
foreign powers could be uncertain of the U.S.’s intentions. For Marshall, 
clear signaling of a commitment to comity would dispel foreign powers’ 
mistrust. Counseling judicial deference to President Adams’s decision to 
extradite a British subject, Thomas Nash, Marshall recommended 
flexibility in the application of American rights such as trial by jury to the 
shifting transnational sphere.106 
Marshall also acknowledged asymmetries in information about 
foreign affairs while serving as Chief Justice. In a classic early decision, 
this acknowledgement spawned the avoidance canon, which narrows the 
scope of statutes to avoid conflicts with the overall legal landscape. 
 
 102. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmond C. Genet (June 17, 1793), in 9 The Writings of 
Thomas Jefferson, at 131, 136 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903) (quoted in 10 Annals of Cong. 599 
(1800) (statement of John Marshall)).  
 103. See 10 Annals of Cong. 598–99 (1800) (statement of John Marshall) (discussing the Genet 
episode); see also Powell, supra note 14, at 1511–27 (discussing Marshall’s views). 
 104. See 2 Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall 255–64 (1916); see also Elkins & 
McKitrick, supra note 17, at 568 (describing the French Directory’s approach to dealing with both the 
U.S. and European governments as that of an “international bully”). 
 105. 10 Annals of Cong. 614–15 (1800). 
 106. Id. at 611. 
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Marshall wrote for the Court in Murray v. The Schooner Charming 
Betsy, which held that courts should interpret statutes to avoid clashes 
with international law.107 Applying the avoidance canon, the Court 
narrowly interpreted a statute that limited trade with France in order to 
reduce the risk of entanglement in foreign conflicts.108 The statutory text 
prohibited Americans from trading with France; the Court declined to 
read it as also prohibiting trade with France by subjects of neutral 
countries, since international law protected the rights of neutrals.109 By 
requiring Congress to state clearly its intent to defy international law, the 
Court sought to ensure that Congress would deliberate carefully before 
enacting a statute with such a disruptive effect. 
The Framers’ efforts to calibrate policy with imperfect information 
about foreign powers had a decidedly darker side, entailing the 
expression of dissent. Not content with measures that limited trade with 
France, the Federalists passed the Sedition Act, which criminalized any 
criticism of policy stated with the intent to cast the government “into 
contempt or disrepute.”110 This episode illustrated that efforts to address 
the problem of imperfect information about foreign powers can suppress 
the exercise of democratic voice at home. 
Concern about American agents promoting foreign designs 
reemerged during the War of 1812. The governor of Massachusetts 
publicly disclosed plans for pending military operations against the 
British.111 New England residents smuggled livestock across the northern 
border, forming an integral link in the supply chain for British troops.112 
 
 107. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate 
the law of nations if any other possible construction remains . . . .”). 
 108. Id. (ordering a navy commander to pay compensation for improperly seizing a vessel owned 
by a national of a neutral power); see also Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and 
Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 Geo. L.J. 479, 482 
(1998); Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of Force, International Law, and the 
Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. Rev. 293, 302 (2005). See generally Peter Margulies, Judging Terror 
in the “Zone of Twilight”: Exigency, Institutional Equity, and Procedure After September 11, 84 B.U. L. 
Rev. 383 (2004) (arguing that courts should interpret statutes authorizing force as being consistent 
with international humanitarian law). 
 109. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118. 
 110. Ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596, 596 (1798); see Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 17, at 592–93; Stone, 
supra note 20, at 37–38 (describing Federalists’ claims that the Sedition Act was justified because of a 
“crowd of spies and inflammatory agents” that was “alienating the affections of our own citizens”); 
Robert M. Chesney, Democratic-Republican Societies, Subversion, and the Limits of Legitimate 
Political Dissent in the Early Republic, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 1525, 1536–51 (2004); Deborah Pearlstein, The 
Constitution and Executive Competence in the Post-Cold War World, 38 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 
547, 566 (2007). 
 111. See Jan Ellen Lewis, Defining the Nation: 1790 to 1898, in Security v. Liberty: Conflicts 
Between Civil Liberties and National Security in American History 117, 133 (Daniel Farber ed., 
2008). 
 112. Id. Over a generation later, concern about British influence fueled movement for the 
annexation of Texas. See David E. Narrett, A Choice of Destiny: Immigration Policy, Slavery, and the 
Annexation of Texas, 100 Sw. Hist. Q. 271, 294–95 (1997). During and immediately after the Civil 
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While the federal government failed to stop this collusion, the aftermath 
of the war saw an increase in national power and a consensus that states 
could not act as agents for a wartime adversary.113 
B. Policy and Paranoia: Foreign Agents in the Twentieth Century 
Concerns about asymmetries of information in dealings with foreign 
powers have continued to animate U.S. policy. Notable incidents of 
foreign influence ensured that the concerns received officials’ attention. 
As in the early period, one strand of policy targeted the problem directly, 
while another strand targeted free expression of ideas. In recent decades, 
the courts have used statutory interpretation, including the canon of 
constitutional avoidance, to nudge policymakers toward the first option. 
American involvement in World War I was spurred by the 
Zimmerman telegram, in which German diplomats including the 
ambassador to the U.S. proposed that Mexico enter into an alliance 
against the U.S.114 During World War II, U.S. citizen Tokyo Rose, acting 
on directions from the Japanese government, broadcast propaganda 
urging American soldiers to abandon the fight.115 Indeed, Tokyo Rose 
was the prototypical agent for a defecting party, since she constructed a 
benign image of the Japanese war effort that conveniently concealed 
wartime atrocities.116 After World War II, espionage by U.S. citizens 
acting on behalf of the Soviet Union ensured the issue’s continued 
currency.117 
Policy responses to this issue range from neutral to repressive. Some 
responses to this concern have focused largely on regulating foreign 
principals’ functional participation in the American economy or political 
scene.118 Congress and the executive branch also have had an incidental 
 
War, Secretary of State Seward expressed his anxiety about France’s effort to install the Austrian 
Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian as emperor of Mexico, and what that effort might portend for French 
interference in American governance. See Frederick W. Seward, Seward at Washington as 
Senator and Secretary of State 190 (New York, Derby & Miller 1891). 
 113. See Lewis, supra note 111, at 133. 
 114. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and National 
Security Information, 83 Ind. L.J. 233, 253 (2008). 
 115. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 947 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 116. Cf. Michael J. Lebowitz, “Terrorist Speech”: Detained Propagandists and the Issue of 
Extraterritorial Application of the First Amendment, 9 First Amend. L. Rev. 573, 596 (2011). 
 117. See G. Edward White, Alexander Vassiliev & Alger Hiss: Part II, 13 Green Bag 2d 85, 89 
(2009) (noting confirmation in Soviet files of the participation of Julius Rosenberg in an espionage 
plot, and tracing the Soviet service of American diplomat—and former law clerk for Justice Holmes—
Alger Hiss). 
 118. For instance, Congress has barred foreign entities and individuals from making direct 
contributions to American political campaigns. 2 U.S.C. § 441e (2010). See generally Neil J. Mitchell, 
Foreign Money and American Politics, 24 Polity 337 (1991) (book review). Legislation also has limited 
foreign ownership of media outlets. 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (2010); see Ian M. Rose, Barring Foreigners 
from Our Airwaves: An Anachronistic Pothole on the Global Information Highway, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 
1188, 1188 (1995). In addition, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act permits courts to issue 
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effect on political speech through measures such as travel bans119 and 
disclosure requirements.120 Officials directly targeted political beliefs 
during World War I121 and the Cold War.122 
Judicial assessments of these measures have hinged on the role of 
asymmetries in information. If a measure targeted the expression of 
ideas, courts declined to grant the government power to shield its policies 
from public debate.123 However, courts typically have upheld measures 
that left space for public debate and that managed asymmetries in 
information between the U.S. and foreign powers. 
During the Cold War, courts relied on the avoidance canon to limit 
the scope of measures targeting ideas. In Yates v. United States, the Court 
construed the Smith Act, which prohibited membership in any 
organization that advocated the government’s forcible overthrow,124 as 
requiring not merely adherence to abstract Communist party doctrine, 
but the instigation of specific action.125 The Court relied on the avoidance 
doctrine, denying that Congress would have casually entered the 
“constitutional danger zone”126 demarcated by the punishment of ideas.127 
 
warrants for surveillance of an agent of a foreign power. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802–1803 (2010); see United 
States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 69 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 119. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 244 (1984) (upholding a ban on travel to Cuba); Zemel v. 
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1965) (same). 
 120. See Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, ch. 327, 52 Stat. 631 (codified as amended at 22 
U.S.C. §§ 611–621 (2010)). The Act currently requires foreign nations to disclose their sponsorship of 
“informational materials” produced on their behalf. Id. § 614. 
 121. See William M. Wiecek, The Legal Foundations of Domestic Anticommunism: The 
Background of Dennis v. United States, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 375, 389–92. 
 122. See id.; see also L.A. Powe, Jr., The Role of the Court, in Security v. Liberty, supra note 111, 
at 165, 167–70 (asserting that avoidance decisions slowed momentum for Cold War restrictions); Philip 
P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and 
Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 Calif. L. Rev. 397, 417–26 (2005). 
 123. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 130 (1958) (holding that Congress had not authorized denial 
of a passport based on expression of unpopular political ideas). 
 124. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 497 (1951) (construing the Alien Registration Act 
of 1940 (the Smith Act), ch. 493, § 3, 54 Stat. 670, 670–71 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 
(2010))). 
 125. See 354 U.S. 298, 318–19 (1957); cf. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 209–10 (1961) 
(imposing a heightened standard requiring both “active” membership in a subversive organization and 
proof of specific intent to overthrow government through violence). 
 126. Yates, 354 U.S. at 319. 
 127. For more on the avoidance doctrine, see Ashwander v. Tennesee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 
288, 345–48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Frickey, supra note 122, at 417–26 (approving of the use 
of the avoidance doctrine in Cold War cases); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance 
Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1549, 1602–13 (2000) (discussing the 
rationale for avoidance). But see Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 71, 90–
97 (expressing skepticism about the legitimacy and utility of the doctrine). Yates and its companion 
cases paved the way for the Court’s landmark holding in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 
(1969), that the government could punish speech advocating violence only when the speaker wished to 
provoke violence and when violence was reasonably likely to occur in the imminent future. See 
Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Judgment Calls: Principle and Politics in Constitutional 
Law 109 (2009) (discussing the Court’s incremental path to Brandenburg). 
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Justice Black, who would have gone further and struck down the statute, 
stressed that upholding the convictions would have compounded 
information asymmetries between the government and its constituents.128 
Justice Black made clear that vacating the convictions deterred 
government’s exploitation of prejudice against “obnoxious or 
unorthodox views” to stifle public debate crucial to democracy.129 
Courts take a more deferential view when statutes or executive 
orders prohibit travel to nations that pursue policies adverse to U.S. 
interests. In applying intermediate scrutiny, courts first require that 
travel restrictions be across the board, rather than selective efforts to 
retaliate against an individual’s expression of her beliefs.130 Once satisfied 
that any effect on speech is incidental, courts cite the role of tourism in 
generating revenue for foreign powers.131 A hostile foreign power could 
leverage those economic benefits to subsidize courses of action that are 
adverse to American interests.132 Courts analogize travel curbs to the 
trade measures undertaken since the Founding Era, holding that 
reducing revenue for hostile foreign powers is an important policy goal 
that travel bans are adequately tailored to achieve.133 When a foreign 
regime has a track record of imprisoning Americans134 and seeking to 
topple other foreign governments allied with the U.S.,135 the political 
branches can cut off this revenue to provide leverage in negotiations.136 
 
 128. Yates, 354 U.S. at 339 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 129. Id. at 339. Justice Black also warned of the threat to constitutional values when “[g]uilt or 
innocence may turn on what Marx or Engels or someone else wrote or advocated as much as a 
hundred or more years ago.” Id. 
 130. See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). 
 131. See, e.g., Emergency Coal. to Defend Educ. Travel v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 545 F.3d 4, 
12–13 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (describing tourism as a “critical and much exploited revenue source” for 
foreign governments). 
 132. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 243 (1984) (noting Cuba’s support for armed violence and 
terrorism and its deployment of troops abroad “in support of objectives inimical to United States 
foreign policy interests”). 
 133. See, e.g., id. at 243; Emergency Coal., 545 F.3d at 12–13; cf. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. 
Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2047, 2101–02 
(2005) (arguing that Zemel and later cases have extended deference to the political branches in foreign 
affairs, outside the realm of the regulation of ideas). 
 134. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 15. 
 135. Id. at 14. 
 136. Emergency Coal., 545 F.3d at 12–13. The case for deference is clearest when Congress and the 
President act jointly. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring); cf. Patricia L. Bellia, The Story of the Steel Seizure Case, in Presidential 
Power Stories, supra note 100, at 233, 273–75 (noting the limits of Youngstown in providing guidance 
to lower courts); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive 
Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, in The Constitution in 
Wartime 173–76 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005) (distinguishing the Court’s holdings in its cases concerning 
the treatment of Japanese-Americans during World War II based on the difference between the 
powers exercised by the President and whether or not his actions were authorized by Congress). But 
see Edward T. Swaine, The Political Economy of Youngstown, 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 263, 316–24 (2010) 
(arguing that the Youngstown framework, because it defers to some degree to the President even 
Margulies_63-HLJ-455 (Do Not Delete) 1/24/2012 6:08 PM 
478  HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:455 
Travel restrictions reduce the impact of asymmetries in information 
between the U.S. and foreign nations in three ways. First, viewed ex ante, 
the mere prospect of such a loss in revenue gives foreign powers 
weighing hostile moves a reason to maintain moderate policies. Second, 
imposing such curbs assures U.S. allies, who otherwise might have reason 
to question the U.S.’s intentions or resolve. Third, travel curbs 
compensate for the naiveté of some U.S. travelers, whom a hostile 
foreign regime could use to extract concessions.137 
Courts also have stressed information asymmetries in upholding 
disclosure requirements for informational material, such as films, 
sponsored by a foreign entity. In Meese v. Keene,138 the Court upheld a 
provision of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938,139 which 
required that any agent of a foreign entity notify the Department of 
Justice of the distribution of “propaganda” on its principal’s behalf.140 
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, asserted that Congress had 
enacted the statute to “better enable the public to evaluate the import” 
 
when Congress is silent, creates an incentive for the President to bypass Congress and clandestinely 
implement policies such as warrantless surveillance). 
 137. The Zemel Court noted that under the so-called “Hostage Act,” 22 U.S.C. § 1732, the 
President had statutory authority to “use such means, not amounting to acts of war as he may think 
necessary and proper” to free American hostages. 381 U.S. at 15. The Court, noting that the Cuban 
Missile Crisis had occurred “less than two months” before the filing of the complaint in the case, 
deemed it reasonable that the President took prophylactic steps such as a travel ban to reduce the 
need to use this authority. Id. at 15–16. Events in another country now subject to travel restrictions 
demonstrated the Court’s prescience. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 675–77 (1981) 
(discussing the Hostage Act’s relevance to presidential authority to settle claims against Iran in 
negotiating the end to the hostage crisis).  
Parties challenging such travel curbs have argued that the information asymmetry argument cuts 
the other way because travel restrictions limit the ability of U.S. citizens to learn about the 
consequences of government policies. See, e.g., Zemel, 381 U.S. at 16. Courts have responded that 
many legitimate measures have an incidental impact on the flow of information. Id. at 16–17 (citing the 
example of rules limiting access to the White House). Moreover, travel curbs typically have included 
exemptions for journalists, scholars, and human rights groups who can learn about country conditions 
and publicize the results of their findings. See, e.g., Emergency Coal., 545 F.3d at 6–7 (upholding a 
modification in the exemption for educational programs). 
 138. 481 U.S. 465, 467, 482–85 (1987). 
 139. Ch. 327, 52 Stat. 631 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 611–621 (2010)).  
 140. 22 U.S.C. § 611(j) (repealed 1995); see Keene, 481 U.S. at 467, 467, 482–85. For criticism of the 
Foreign Agents Registration Act as inconsistent with First Amendment jurisprudence, see Burt 
Neuborne & Steven R. Shapiro, The Nylon Curtain: America’s National Border and the Free Flow of 
Ideas, 26 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 719, 735–38 (1985); Zick, The First Amendment in Transborder 
Perspective, supra note 6, at 950–53 (asserting that the legislation’s purpose was the inhibition of 
political speech). In 1995, without any judicial prodding, Congress amended the statute on functional 
grounds by repealing § 611(j) and replacing the term “propaganda,” with the term “informational 
materials.” Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub L. No. 104-65, § 9, 109 Stat. 691, 699–700 (codified 
as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 611–614(a) (2010)). These reforms were suggested in order to increase 
compliance with the disclosure requirements by those who were reluctant to acknowledge their link to 
“propaganda.” See Charles Lawson, Note, Shining the “Spotlight of Pitiless Publicity” on Foreign 
Lobbyists? Evaluating the Impact of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 on the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act, 29 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1151, 1171 (1996). 
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of the materials.141 In that sense, he noted, the requirement dovetailed 
with the commitment to transparency behind the Court’s commercial 
speech jurisprudence.142 Justice Stevens also used statutory 
interpretation, as the Court had years earlier in Yates, to avoid any 
constitutional problems with stigma imposed by the term “propaganda.” 
He noted that parties did not have to expressly identify materials as 
propaganda in the form provided for disclosure,143 and that Congress had 
defined propaganda in “broad, neutral” terms that echoed common 
dictionary definitions.144 Rather than single out allegedly seditious 
material, Congress had covered any communication by friend or foe 
designed to influence or persuade.145 Another definition, such as 
“material adverse to American interests,” could have triggered 
vagueness concerns. But the ample flow of material under the current 
regime suggested that the duty to disclose had not chilled speech.146 
III.  Regulating the Assets of Terrorist Groups: Information 
Asymmetries and the Continuum of Human and Financial Capital 
Terrorist groups like Hamas,147 the PKK,148 and the now largely 
defunct LTTE149 inspire the same concerns about asymmetries in 
 
 141. Keene, 481 U.S. at 480–81. 
 142. Id. at 481–82 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748 (1976)). 
 143. Id. at 471. 
 144. Id. at 477–78 & n.10 (noting the definition of “propaganda” as “doctrines, ideas, arguments, 
facts, or allegations spread by deliberate effort through any medium of communication in order to 
further one’s cause or to damage an opposing cause” (quoting Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary 1817 (1981)). 
 145. See 22 U.S.C. § 611(j) (repealed 1995) (“The term ‘political propaganda includes 
any . . . communication . . . reasonably adapted to . . . in any . . . way influence a recipient or any 
section of the public within the United States with reference to the political or public interests, 
policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party or with reference 
to the foreign policies of the United States . . . .”); Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(declining to construe the provision as applying only to “subversive” propaganda); United States v. 
Kelly, 51 F. Supp. 362, 363 (D.D.C. 1943) (“[The Foreign Agents Registration Act ] sought to bring 
about disclosure of the authorship and source of [material] . . . which appeared in publications and 
other media . . . at the instance of, and particularly when pursuant to compensation paid by, foreign 
governments, or foreign factions or parties, whether friendly or unfriendly, whether violent or mild.”). 
 146. Distributors complying with the provision had disclosed foreign sponsorship of a wide range 
of films, including a Canadian documentary on acid rain, a movie distributed by the Israeli consulate 
on the persecution of Soviet Jewry, a film distributed by the West German consulate critical of the 
Berlin Wall, another German-sponsored opus entitled, “Berlin Means Business and More,” and a film 
distributed by Japan extolling free trade. See Keene, 481 U.S. at 483 n.17; Block, 793 F.3d at 1312. 
Justice Stevens also echoed the commercial speech jurisprudence in noting that distributors were free 
to insert additional material with their disclosure, thereby creating “more speech” to counteract any 
stigmatizing effect. Keene, 481 U.S. at 481 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring)). 
 147. See Levitt, supra note 26, at 135. 
 148. The PKK, also known as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, was founded in 1974. To promote an 
independent Kurdish state, it has engaged in a long campaign of violence against both civilians and 
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information about foreign powers that drove the Framers’ deliberations. 
DFTOs use any asset available to them to promote violence, but reject 
the accounting principles that would make their activities transparent. 
This rejection of transparency is clearest in the case of cash donations to 
foreign terrorist groups, which all nine Justices of the Supreme Court 
agreed in HLP that Congress could prohibit.150 The rejection of 
accounting principles is also an apt metaphor for DFTOs’ exploitation of 
human capital, including agency ties that generate funds and fresh 
recruits. Like the worst-case scenario in Part I of an agent’s aid to a 
defecting party, DFTOs use agents to exploit asymmetries in 
information. For Congress, combating those information asymmetries 
through global coordination requires a comprehensive framework, 
including § 2339B, which bars a wide range of “material support” to 
terrorist groups.151 
To sustain this framework but also to guard against the 
government’s curbing of public debate, the HLP Court fashioned a 
hybrid approach that blended intermediate and heightened scrutiny with 
the avoidance canon. The activities that the plaintiffs told the Supreme 
Court they wished to pursue involved not cash but speech, including 
assisting DFTOs in negotiation and training DFTOs in the use of 
international law and of nonviolent techniques.152 Because these activities 
entail speech, the Court recognized that heightened scrutiny was 
appropriate.153 However, just as in the attorney speech cases described 
above, a common attribute of the activities the plaintiffs sought to 
protect was the existence of an agency relationship. Reviewing the 
plaintiffs’ claims required a model that bears a surprising resemblance to 
the approach the Court has taken in cases involving the regulation of 
lawyers. Even as HLP regulated speech related to agency, as the Court 
 
military targets in Turkey. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2713 (2010); 
Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence 286–95 
(2007). 
 149. The LTTE, commonly known as the Tamil Tigers, were a Sri Lanka group that engaged in 
suicide attacks and guerilla warfare, ostensibly to gain autonomy for the ethnic Tamil population. The 
Sri Lankan government defeated the LTTE in 2009 after a bloody campaign that regained territory 
controlled by the group but also cost the lives of many Tamil civilians. See Jon Lee Anderson, Death of 
the Tiger: Sri Lanka’s Brutal Victory over Its Tamil Insurgents, New Yorker, Jan. 17, 2011, at 41, 47; 
see also Phil Williams, Terrorist Financing and Organized Crime: Nexus, Appropriation, or 
Transformation?, in Countering the Financing of Terrorism 126, 138–39 (Thomas J. Biersteker & 
Sue E. Eckert eds., 2008) (detailing the involvement of the LTTE in criminal conduct, including the 
heroin trade, human trafficking, gun-running, and extortion). 
 150. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2741 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that cash contributions are “inherently . . . likely” to facilitate violence, and therefore 
Congress has the power to prohibit such contributions). 
 151.  See supra note 25. 
 152. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2720–21 (majority opinion). 
 153. Id. at 2723–24. 
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had done in the pretrial-publicity context, the decision also built a safe 
harbor that can accommodate independent advocacy, scholarship, 
journalism, human rights monitoring, and legal representation. 
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion imported some of the conventions 
of the intermediate scrutiny model, including a willingness to assess 
government justifications from an ex ante perspective. An ex ante point 
of view considers how a given measure shapes incentives for future 
conduct.154 Viewed ex ante, barring agency relationships with DFTOs 
enhances the possibility of cooperation among foreign entities and 
between those entities, and the U.S. Courts have sometimes adopted an 
ex ante perspective to justify other limits on speech155 and have also done 
so in decisions expanding speech rights156 and crafting evidentiary 
privileges that limit disclosure in court to spur useful activity.157 An ex 
ante approach also dovetails with the lawyer speech cases and with the 
approach that courts have traditionally taken to managing asymmetries 
of information in foreign affairs. 
Mention of the avoidance canon is ironic because HLP’s principal 
flaw is an unnecessary display of broad deference to government fact 
finding. The decision’s factual predicate—the systemic defection of 
terrorist groups—rests securely on independent accounts. The majority 
did not need to rely on government assertions. Moreover, the Court’s 
deference, viewed ex ante, might encourage the political branches to 
overreach. That eventuality highlights the need for the safe harbors that 
the decision provides to those challenging government policy. 
A. DFTOs’ Poor Accounting: Reinforcing Violence Through 
Putatively Nonviolent Activities 
Like so many other stories, this one starts with money. DFTOs work 
diligently to gather funds for putatively nonviolent purposes, siphon off 
those funds into violence, and conceal the funds’ source and destination. 
 
 154. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives 
on Innovation, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 803, 840 (1988) (noting the premise that, viewed ex ante, patent 
protections provide an incentive for greater innovation); see also Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of 
Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 
118 Yale L.J. 2, 32 (2008) (noting the conventional account that judicial review encourages 
government officials to take greater care in making decisions, since officials know that judicial review 
will reveal any mistakes). 
 155. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759–60 (1982) (upholding more intrusive regulation of 
the distribution chain for child pornography as necessary to “dry up” the market). 
 156. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 300 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“The 
opinion of the court conclusively demonstrates the chilling effect of the . . . libel laws on First 
Amendment freedoms . . . .”). 
 157. See Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussing Federal Rule 
of Evidence 407, which excludes evidence of subsequent repairs to promote the “social policy of 
encouraging people to take, or least not discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance of added 
safety” (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 407 advisory committee’s note)). 
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Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in HLP, courts repeatedly found 
that terrorist groups disdained sound accounting principles.158 Courts also 
realized early in the lengthy history of the HLP litigation that because 
cash is fungible, support for putatively nonviolent programs “frees up 
resources that can be used for terrorist acts.”159 Because of this link, 
Congress found that DFTOs, like state sponsors of terrorism, “are so 
tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an 
organization facilitates that conduct.”160 A more holistic focus on DFTOs’ 
poor accounting also highlights the link between DFTOs’ financial and 
human capital assets. 
1. The Statutory Framework 
Section 2339B, passed as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing, 
reflected Congress’s view that curbs on the concrete instrumentalities of 
violence, such as “explosives,” would be futile without limits on the 
financial and human capital that facilitate violence.161 In the Act and 
 
 158. See Kilburn v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 376 F.3d 1123, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (“[T]errorist organizations can hardly be counted on to keep careful bookkeeping records.”); 
United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 329 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that proof of specific intent to 
aid violence is not required for a criminal conviction based on a defendant’s financial contribution to 
Hezbollah because “terrorist organizations do not maintain open books” (quoting Humanitarian Law 
Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000))), vacated, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005), remanded to 405 
F.3d 1034 (2005). But see Jeroen Gunning, Terrorism, Charities, and Diasporas: Contrasting the 
Fundraising Practices of Hamas and al Qaeda Among Muslims in Europe, in Countering the 
Financing of Terrorism, supra note 149, at 93, 100–01 (asserting that Hamas has a “reputation for 
financial transparency,” due to its efforts to attract charitable contributions for its humanitarian 
efforts, while conceding that it may resort to “money laundering and smuggling” in some of its 
operations). 
 159. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub 
nom., Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 532 U.S. 904 (2001); see also Khan v. Holder, 584 F.3d 
773, 777 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Reno); Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 698 
(7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150, 1160 (9th Cir. 2005) (observing that because of 
fungibility, “donation of money could properly be viewed by the government as . . . like the donation 
of bombs and ammunition”); Kilburn, 376 F.3d at 1130. 
 160. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301(a)(7), 
110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2010)). Financial assistance to 
terrorist groups has also become a focus of international concern. See S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 1(d), U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (requiring states to prohibit anyone within their personal or 
territorial jurisdiction from making any funds, resources, or financial services available to persons who 
commit terrorist acts or to entities controlled by them); Financial Action Task Force, Fatf IX 
Special Recommendations 2 (2008) (noting the importance of international cooperation). 
 161. The 1996 statute supplemented an earlier provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, that prohibited acting 
with specific intent to cause violence to others for the purpose of influencing government policy. See 
Norman Abrams, The Material Support Terrorism Offenses: Perspectives Derived from the (Early) 
Model Penal Code, 1 J. Nat’l Security L. & Pol’y 5, 8–9 (2005) (“Section 2339A . . . targets aid 
provided for use in carrying out specific crimes; section 2339B criminalizes the provision of aid to an 
organization that engages in terrorist crimes.”). Prosecutors continue to rely heavily on the earlier 
provision, particularly in conspiracy cases. See Margulies, supra note 22, at 111–15 (analyzing cases); 
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subsequent amendments, Congress prohibited provision of “any 
property, tangible or intangible, or service,” including “financial 
services,” “personnel,” “training,” and “expert advice or assistance.”162 
The statute defines “training” as the teaching of a “specific skill,”163 and 
“expert advice or assistance” as “scientific, technical or other specialized 
knowledge.”164 Barring all such benefits dovetails with Congress’s goal to 
“interrupt, or at least imperil, the flow of money” “at any point along the 
causal chain of terrorism.”165 
Under the designation process, the Secretary of State determines 
there is evidence indicating that particular organizations such as Al 
Qaeda, Hamas, or the LTTE have a track record of violence, particularly 
violence against innocents.166 The government then informs the 
organization’s representatives, who have an opportunity to review 
unclassified evidence and submit material rebutting the government’s 
assertions.167 If the government determines that its evidence warrants 
designation of the group as a foreign terrorist organization, the group can 
appeal to a federal court, which will set aside a designation that is 
arbitrary and capricious, not based on substantial evidence, or 
inconsistent with procedural safeguards.168 
 
Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the Challenge of Unaffiliated 
Terrorism, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 425, 474–86 (2007) (same). See generally Richard B. Zabel & James J. 
Benjamin, Jr., In Pursuit of Justice: Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the Federal Courts: 2009 
Update and Recent Developments 13–16 (2009) (analyzing recent prosecutions under §§ 2339A and 
2339B); David S. Kris, Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool, 5 J. Nat’l Security L. & Pol’y 1, 
84–93 (2011) (providing case studies of successful outcomes in prosecutions under both subsections). 
 162. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2010). After earlier litigation in HLP, Congress clarified certain 
of these definitions in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
458, § 6603, 118 Stat. 3638, 3762–3764. For example, Congress stated that “personnel” included only 
those acting under the DFTO’s direction or control or those providing such direction and control, and 
did not include independent actors. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h) (2010). 
 163. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(2). This clarification, and the clarification on “expert advice or 
assistance,” infra note 164, also originated with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
of 2004. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2715 (2010). 
 164. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(3); see Chesney, supra note 25, at 12–18 (discussing the context of the 
statute’s enactment). 
 165. See S. Rep. No. 102-342 at 22 (1992) (setting out the rationale for providing civil remedies for 
victims of terrorism in 18 U.S.C. § 2333). 
 166. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (2010). 
 167. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(B); see People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 613 F.3d 
220, 229–30 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (discussing the process and holding that the government had violated due 
process by failing to give the DFTO an opportunity to view unclassified evidence prior to making a 
final decision denying its petition to revoke the DFTO designation). 
 168. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(1)–(3); see United States v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150, 1160 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(upholding the process and barring collateral review of the designation in subsequent criminal cases); 
Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
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2. DFTOs, the Nexus of Violent and Nonviolent Programs, and 
Intermediate Scrutiny 
Both Congress and courts ruling before the HLP decision 
recognized that a comprehensive framework is essential to combatting 
DFTOs’ exploitation of ostensibly nonviolent programs to supply 
incentives for violence. For example, terrorist groups like Hamas provide 
special assistance to families of suicide bombers, “thus making the 
decision to engage in terrorism more attractive.”169 Schools and clerics 
sponsored by terrorist groups help funnel new recruits.170 Public goods 
such as education, health services, and welfare lock in group membership 
because an individual who exits the group loses access to these goods.171 
This functional link between nonviolent programs and violent acts 
reinforced courts’ application of intermediate scrutiny to uphold 
Congress’s bar on cash contributions.172 A measure prevails under 
intermediate scrutiny if it is content neutral, furthers an important 
governmental objective, and is tailored to achieve that goal.173 According 
to courts, a measure that meets these criteria imposes a merely incidental 
burden on free speech.174 Curbing cash contributions is content neutral in 
 
 169. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom., 
Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 532 U.S. 904 (2001); see Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief 
& Dev., 549 F.3d, 685, 698 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Hamas’s social welfare activities reinforce its terrorist 
activities . . . by providing economic assistance to the families of killed, wounded, and captured Hamas 
fighters . . . .”); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 585 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that 
targeted payments to families of suicide bombers constitute “incentive” to terrorist acts); cf. Gunning, 
supra note 158, at 102 (acknowledging payments of $5,000 to families of suicide bombers); Jerrold M. 
Post et al., The Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern 
Terrorists, 15 Terrorism & Pol. Violence 171, 177 (2003) (“Families of terrorists who were wounded, 
killed, or captured enjoyed a great deal of economic aid and attention. . . . [F]amilies got a great deal 
of material assistance, including the construction of new homes.” (quoting a jailed terrorist)). 
 170. See Boim, 549 F.3d at 698 (“Hamas’s social welfare activities reinforce its terrorist 
activities . . . [by] providing funds for indoctrinating schoolchildren.”); see also Levitt, supra note 26, at 
135 (noting links between a Hamas-affiliated cleric preaching violence and an individual inspired by 
the cleric to “scout[] potential sites for suicide bombings in Jerusalem”); Post et al., supra note 169, at 
183 (reporting that fifty percent of jailed terrorists interviewed by authors cited experience at a 
mosque or other religious influence as “central”). 
 171. See Boim, 549 F.3d at 698 (noting that Hamas’s social service programs “mak[e] it more 
costly . . . to defect”); see also Eli Berman & David D. Laitin, Religion, Terrorism, and Public Goods: 
Testing the Club Model, 92 J. Pub. Econ. 1942, 1952, 1955 (2008); Justin Magouirk, The Nefarious 
Helping Hand: Anti-Corruption Campaigns, Social Services Provision, and Terrorism, 20 Terrorism & 
Pol. Violence 356, 358 (2008) (discussing Hamas’s provision of social services). 
 172. See Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Treasury Dep’t, 578 F.3d 1133, 1148–49 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(upholding broad curbs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act); Emergency Coal. 
to Defend Educ. Travel v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 545 F.3d 4, 12–13 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (upholding 
regulations on travel to Cuba as imposing a mere incidental burden on free speech); Reno, 205 F.3d at 
1136. 
 173. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (stating the intermediate scrutiny test). 
See generally Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1175 
(1996) (discussing the incidental burdens doctrine and offering some caveats). 
 174. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. 
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that potential donors remain free to praise terrorist activity and criticize 
the policies of both the U.S. and its allies.175 The curb on financial support 
vindicates a core governmental interest: disrupting the operations of 
transnational organizations that engage in terrorist activity.176 Finally, 
such curbs are tailored to achieving this goal: Asymmetries in 
information benefit foreign terrorist groups, impeding enforcement of 
direct prohibitions against violence abroad.177 Because of the difficulty of 
enforcing direct prohibitions outside the U.S., curbing financial and other 
support is necessary to deter future violence.178 
B. Terrorist Agents and Hybrid Scrutiny 
The distinctive challenge in HLP arose because the speech that the 
plaintiffs wished to direct at DFTOs typically prompts heightened 
scrutiny of government regulation. As Chief Justice Roberts recognized, 
under § 2339B the legal status of the plaintiffs’ activity hinged on its 
content.179 The statute barred both “training” that provided a “specific 
skill” and “expert advice or assistance” that furnished “specialized 
knowledge” to a DFTO.180 By definition, such speech differs in content 
from speech to DFTOs that Congress permitted.181 On the other hand, 
 
 175. See Reno, 205 F.3d at 1133–36. This view poses a tension with campaign finance decisions like 
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), which view money as the virtual equivalent of speech. 
The most direct way of resolving this tension is to argue that Citizens United is wrong and that 
government has a legitimate interest in regulating contributions of both money and broadcast 
advertising for the benefit of particular candidates. The more cautious answer is that the nexus 
between political speech and spending makes campaign finance an exceptional case. Protection 
accorded to contributions to entirely lawful political campaigns should not necessarily cover 
contributions to a vast spectrum of commercial and not-for-profit entities, foreign and domestic, where 
courts have previously upheld regulation. See Jeff Breinholt, Resolved, or Is It? The First Amendment 
and Giving Money to Terrorists, 57 Am. U. L. Rev. 1273, 1280 (2008). 
 176. See Reno, 205 F.3d at 1135–36; see also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996, Pub. L. 104-132, § 301(6), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2010)) 
(“[S]ome foreign terrorist organizations, acting through affiliated groups or individuals, raise 
significant funds within the United States, or use the United States as a conduit for the receipt of funds 
raised in other nations . . . .”). 
 177. Reno, 205 F.3d at 1136.  
 178. Id. at 1135–36; cf. Gerald L. Neuman, Terrorism, Selective Deportation and the First 
Amendment After Reno v. AADC, 14 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 313, 331 (2000) (“The United States has 
limited ability to enforce anti-terrorist legislation against foreign organizations that are based in 
countries with which the United States has amicable relations, and even less ability to enforce it 
against organizations that are based in hostile countries.”). 
 179. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2722–24 (2010). 
 180. Id. at 2723. 
 181. See id. at 2723–24 (contrasting prohibited training with instruction that merely provides 
“general knowledge”); cf. Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Government 
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413, 443–44 (1996) (arguing that courts use 
strict scrutiny of content-based restrictions to ferret out a government motive to suppress ideas); 
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 189, 191–94 
(1983) (discussing the rationale for strict scrutiny of content regulation). The HLP plaintiffs also 
argued that the statute was vague as applied because it did not provide adequate guidance on 
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the Court reasoned, the statute did not target the expression of ideas, but 
only certain interactions with a particular listener.182 By permitting 
individuals to say “anything they wish on any topic”183 outside of this 
relation to a DFTO, including speech directed at the world in general, 
§ 2339B regulated the relationship with the DFTO, rather than ideas per 
se.184 The speech activity at issue therefore claimed a place midway 
between pure political speech, which triggers virtually absolute 
protection, and the regulation of relationships such as agency between 
individuals and organizations, which usually elicits judicial deference. 
The distinctive and contained site of the speech at issue in HLP thus 
required a hybrid form of scrutiny. 
1. Curbing DFTOs’ Gaming of Information Asymmetries 
Just as in the cases on attorney-client relationships, the Court’s 
hybrid model in HLP focused on managing asymmetries in 
information.185 The Court recognized that services to a DFTO constitute 
human capital, a form of material support on a continuum with cash.186 
Just as money for social services tightens a terrorist group’s hold on its 
members, providing services, training, or expert advice to the DFTO 
furnishes something of value that the DFTO can exploit.187 
Agents are useful to DFTOs for the same reason they are useful in 
ordinary commercial transactions: By creating trust between parties, they 
reduce the transaction costs that information asymmetries create.188 
Lawyer-agents engineer parties’ reputations: Writing opinion letters 
vouching for a party’s financial health, lawyers leverage their own 
 
distinguishing training involving a “specific skill” from instruction that merely offered general 
knowledge. See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2720–22. The Court rejected this argument. 
Id.; see infra Part IV.A. (analyzing the Court’s definition and suggesting guidance for future cases). 
 182. See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2722 (arguing that the statute barred only 
advocacy performed in coordination with, or at the direction of, a DFTO). 
 183. Id. at 2722–23. 
 184. Id. (rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim that the statute banned “pure political speech”). The amicus 
brief on which I served as co-counsel argued that this centrality of relationships, not ideas, called for 
intermediate instead of heightened scrutiny. Brief of Amicus Curiae Scholars, Attorneys, and Fomer 
Public Officials with Experience in Terrorism-Related Issues in Support of Petitioners at 27–28, Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (No. 08-1498), 2009 WL 5070069, at *27–28. 
 185. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2727 (“[N]ational security and foreign policy 
concerns arise in connection with efforts to confront evolving threats in an area where information can 
be difficult to obtain and the impact of certain conduct difficult to assess.”). 
 186. Id. at 2725–26. 
 187. Id. at 2727 (“Given the purposes, organizational structure, and clandestine nature of foreign 
terrorist organizations, it is highly likely that any material support to these organizations will 
ultimately inure to the benefit of their criminal, terrorist functions—regardless of whether such 
support was ostensibly intended to support non-violent, non-terrorist activities.” (quoting Declaration 
of Kenneth R. McKune, U.S. Dep’t of State, Joint App. at 133, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 
S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (No. 08-1498), 2009 WL 3877534, at *133 [hereinafter McKune Affidavit])). 
 188. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. 
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reputations to burnish the goodwill owed to their clients.189 However, the 
mutually productive course of dealing that the reputation engineer 
enables depends on the parties’ following through. A party who uses an 
agent to maximize the returns of defection from the agreement 
undermines not only that agreement but the prospects for future 
agreement, as well. 
This nightmare scenario for agreements is the DFTO business 
model. DFTOs have a track record that speaks to a pattern of defection 
rather than cooperation. This pattern of defection arises from structural 
imperatives that deprive terrorist groups of the capacities for 
deliberation and reciprocity that characterize most sovereign states. 
Since terrorist groups must plan in secret,190 they seal themselves off from 
moderate voices that might temper their tactics.191 While states often 
have constituencies or institutions that can check the excesses of their 
leaders,192 terrorist groups lack this valuable check. Terrorist groups’ 
insularity also distorts their temporal perspective. Most terrorist groups 
are confident that they will ultimately achieve an epic and unconditional 
victory over their enemies.193 Groups who define their mission in 
religious terms—often counter to mainstream views—perceive violence 
as a sacred duty.194 This polarized environment equates pragmatic 
compromise with wholesale betrayal. The group dynamics of DFTOs 
therefore bid up violence.195 
Moreover, terrorist groups often become prisoners of the 
manipulation they practice. An act of violence brings benefits no matter 
how an opposing government reacts: Whether officials are intimidated or 
overreach, terrorists can claim success. Violent acts further discredit any 
 
 189. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 190. See Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism 179–80 (1998). 
 191. Id. at 178; cf. Kydd & Walter, supra note 29, at 72–73 (discussing how terrorist groups use 
violence as a spoiler to discredit moderates); Andrew H. Kydd & Barbara F. Walter, Sabotaging the 
Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence, 56 Int’l Org. 263, 279–89 (2002) [hereinafter Kydd & 
Walter, Sabotaging the Peace] (same); see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 Yale L.J. 
1307, 1318–23 (2003) (observing that secrecy has a polarizing effect on criminal conspiracies). 
 192. Judicial review, for example, tames the “undivided, uncontrolled power” that otherwise 
distorts governance. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008); cf. Jack Goldsmith, The 
Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Administration 206–07 (2007) (arguing 
that the Bush administration’s unilateralism diminished support in other branches for its policies, 
whereas greater consultation up front would have tempered policies and heightened support). Because 
terrorist groups lack the “return address” that makes nations accountable in a global order, these 
groups also lack the constraint furnished by international law. See Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 
82, at 1826–28, 1835 (discussing the role of international law). 
 193. See Hoffman, supra note 190, at 169 (“[T]errorists . . . live in the future . . . for that distant—
yet imperceptibly close—point in time when they will assuredly triumph over their enemies and attain 
the ultimate realization of their political destiny.”). 
 194. Id. at 168–69. 
 195. Kydd & Walter, supra note 29, at 76–77. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Going to Extremes: 
How Like Minds Unite and Divide (2009) (discussing the dynamics of polarization). 
Margulies_63-HLJ-455 (Do Not Delete) 1/24/2012 6:08 PM 
488  HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:455 
moderates within terrorist ranks: If a government overreaches, 
extremists can say, “I told you so.”196 If the government draws back, 
extremists can argue that substantive concessions on their part are 
unnecessary, since the group is already winning.197 Even when a state 
retaliates, terrorist groups often can readily move their operatives and 
evade capture.198 In an age of social networking across borders, terrorists’ 
relative freedom from a fixed location yields additional tactical 
advantages. This internalized “heads I win, tails you lose” syndrome casts 
violence as a winning strategy and blinds terrorist groups to more abiding 
trends that can render violence dysfunctional, even on its own terms.199 
While some members of terrorist groups may see past these blinders and 
strive for a transition from violence, the obstacles to this clarity of vision 
are formidable. 
Like any other habitually defecting party, a DFTO needs agents to 
fully exploit the information asymmetries in its favor. An unvarying 
campaign of terrorist violence can jeopardize the DFTO’s success by 
spurring equally persistent governmental efforts to eradicate it.200 To earn 
a respite from these efforts, DFTOs therefore have an incentive to 
occasionally promote themselves as reliable partners.201 Like other 
chronic defectors, however, the DFTO has a problem: It can maximize 
the returns from defection only by persuading another party of its 
goodwill. A defecting party like a DFTO can solve this problem by 
 
 196. See Kydd & Walter, supra note 29, at 69–70. 
 197. Id. at 62–63; Gary LaFree & Laura Dugan, Research on Terrorism and Countering Terrorism, 
38 Crime & Just. 413, 422 (2009) (discussing incentives for heightened violence in terrorist groups). 
 198. See Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive 
Elements, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 697, 731 (2010) (noting terrorist groups’ advantages in evading 
targeting and capture); Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC 
“Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 641, 661 (2010) 
(same). 
 199. Cf. Hoffman, supra note 190, at 170 (noting that most terrorist groups disappear within a 
decade). 
 200. See Kydd & Walter, supra note 29, at 68 (discussing effective state responses to the terrorist 
strategy of intimidation). 
 201. See C. Maria Keet, Towards a Resolution of Terrorism Using Game Theory 16–17 (2003) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.meteck.org/TERRORISM_WP.pdf; see also id. at 
27 (discussing terrorist groups’ defection). Of course, governments opposing terrorism can defect as 
well. Regimes targeted by terrorist groups should not get a pass on their own policies. Indeed, while 
pushing for reform of such regimes will not eliminate terrorism, often it will encourage moderate 
alternatives to terrorist groups. A failure to reform may only boost terrorist groups’ pretensions to 
legitimacy. See Sudha Setty, Comparative Perspectives on Specialized Trials for Terrorism, 63 Me. L. 
Rev. 131, 155–56 (2010) (asserting that the United Kingdom’s former policy in Northern Ireland of 
authorizing detention without trial led to radicalization of the Catholic community and increased 
violence as the IRA used the policy “as an effective recruiting tool”); cf. Kim Lane Scheppele, The 
International Standardization of National Security Law, 4 J. Nat’l Security L. & Pol’y 437, 450–51 
(2010) (arguing that international restrictions on terrorist financing, such as Security Council 
Resolution 1373, undermine rights because enforcement of the restrictions and respect for 
fundamental rights vary widely between countries). 
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employing agents who engender the goodwill that the DFTO’s past 
conduct has dissipated. Two kinds of agents work best: those who 
approve of the group’s violent aims but are skillful enough to conceal 
their approval, and those who do not approve of violence per se but are 
willing to overlook or rationalize it, through arguments that the violence 
is only a small part of the activity of an otherwise benign group, that the 
group is gradually weaning itself from violence, or that the other side is 
even worse. In any event, these agents compound the information 
asymmetries between the parties, giving the DFTO more benefits upon 
its defection.202 
Consider the ostensibly benevolent art of negotiation, in which the 
HLP plaintiffs wished to train or assist DFTOs like the PKK.203 The 
Court held that Congress could bar agents of the DFTO from engaging 
in such activity.204 In his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts observed that the 
PKK and other DFTOs could “pursue peaceful negotiation as a means of 
buying time to recover from short-term setbacks, lulling opponents into 
complacency, and ultimately preparing for renewed attacks.”205 Justice 
Breyer, in his dissent, dismissed such arguments as “general and 
 
 202. Because each of the levels of scienter mentioned in the text compound information 
asymmetries, the agent’s knowledge that the group is a DFTO is sufficient to support liability. Holder 
v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 (2010). The plaintiffs argued that for speech-
related activities, the government should be required to show specific intent to further violence. Id. 
However, this requirement is not constitutionally necessary and also makes a poor fit with the 
comprehensive framework that Congress enacted. In the domestic sphere, criminalizing help to an 
organization would require a showing of specific intent to aid the group’s illegal conduct. See Scales v. 
United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229–30 (1961). However, the government does not face the same 
information asymmetries in directly regulating the illegal conduct of domestic groups. See Neuman, 
supra note 178, at 331. Therefore, no public interest counsels against a higher scienter requirement for 
criminalizing aid to domestic organizations. Cf. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2730 
(disclaiming any suggestion that Congress could extend comparable prohibitions to domestic groups); 
Bhagwat, supra note 8, at 1010 n.150 (viewing this disclaimer as preserving free speech and 
association). Moreover, even in the domestic sphere, professional regulation does not require a 
showing of specific intent. In the pretrial-publicity context, for example, a lawyer who makes public 
comments that pose a substantial likelihood of material prejudice can be sanctioned even when she 
does not intend specifically to prejudice the outcome. See Wendel, supra note 12, at 400. The key 
factors here, as in the material support of DFTOs, are information asymmetries and the need for rules 
of the road in a specialized system.  
A specific-intent requirement would also undermine Congress’s comprehensive scheme. 
Congress expressly set the scienter level at knowledge of a DFTO’s designation or record of violence. 
See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2717 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2010)). 
Requiring specific intent for speech-related activities would make the statute a patchwork quilt, since 
the plaintiffs acknowledged that specific intent was not required for charges based on the provision of 
ammunition, communications equipment, and other tangible items. Id. at 2718. Requiring disparate 
scienter levels for violations of the same statutory section would impede enforcement and actually 
offer less guidance to parties who wished to conform their conduct. 
 203. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2729. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
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speculative.”206 However, independent sources amply document DFTOs’ 
consistent recourse to this strategy. 
Journalists and scholars have noted that DFTOs such as the PKK, 
Hamas, and Hezbollah regularly use truces and negotiation to prepare 
for renewed violence. The PKK, for example, has used truces not as 
preludes to peace, but as expedient punctuations to violent campaigns.207 
Hezbollah has used the respite gained from the end of Israel’s offensive 
against it in Lebanon to rebuild its storehouse of offensive weapons.208 In 
Sri Lanka, the LTTE undermined a truce by assassinating a prominent 
moderate official and obstructing a reservoir that provided water to 
thousands of farmers.209 
DFTOs’ leveraging of information asymmetries encourages such 
manipulation. Only a DFTO knows when the organization will deem it 
expedient to terminate a truce and resume the targeting of civilians. That 
uncertainty is a tactical benefit that negotiators for a DFTO enhance, 
whether or not the negotiators specifically intend to facilitate terrorist 
acts. The First Amendment should not bar Congress from prohibiting 
training that merely adjusts the spigot of violence. 
Similarly, while the HLP plaintiffs wished to train DFTOs in “the 
use of international law,”210 evidence suggests that DFTOs already 
manipulate this knowledge for strategic purposes. Consider the analysis 
of the Gaza police force in the United Nations-sponsored Goldstone 
Report, which examined human rights in Israel and the occupied 
territories during and immediately after Israel’s military intervention in 
Gaza in 2008–2009.211 The report, which obtained most of its information 
 
 206. Id. at 2739 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Leading Cases, supra note 6, at 265 (arguing that 
the HLP majority’s account of DFTOs’ manipulation of international law and organizations was 
“conclusory,” “of dubious probability,” and “insufficient to satisfy heightened scrutiny”). 
 207. See Marcus, supra note 148, at 286–95; see also Catherine Collins, Kurd Violence Rises in 
Turkey, Raising Fears of a Renewed War, Chi. Trib., May 18, 2005, at 6 (discussing the return to 
violence by groups associated with the PKK after the end of a truce); Ayla Jean Yackley, 20 Injured in 
Turkish Resort Bomb, Irish Times, July 11, 2005, (World) at 11 (reporting the explosion of a bomb for 
which the militant wing of the PKK claimed responsibility, which injured twenty people, including at 
least one critically, and which came after a unilateral truce declared by the PKK). 
 208. See Michael R. Gordon & Andrew W. Lehren, Straining to Stop Arms Flow: U.S. Officials 
Frustrated in Blocking Weapons from Reaching Militants, Int’l Herald Trib., Dec. 7, 2010, at 7 
(noting that Hezbollah, a DFTO based in Lebanon, has an arms inventory that includes “50,000 
rockets and missiles, including some 40 to 50 Fatah-110 missiles capable of reaching Tel Aviv and most 
of Israel, and 10 Scud-D missiles”); cf. Ian Black, US Used Israel Intelligence to Block Arms from Iran 
and Syria, Guardian (London), Dec. 7, 2010, at 6 (detailing U.S. efforts to halt arms shipments to 
both Hamas and Hezbollah). Hezbollah, a Shiite group that precipitated an armed conflict with Israel 
in 2006, allegedly has also used narcotics trafficking and money laundering for strategic purposes. See 
Jo Becker, Beirut Bank Seen as a Hub of Hezbollah’s Financing, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 2011, at A1. 
 209. See Anderson, supra note 149, at 47. 
 210. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2723–24 (majority opinion). 
 211. See Rep. of U.N. Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 
(Sept. 25, 2009) [hereinafter Goldstone Report]; cf. Laurie R. Blank, Finding Facts but Missing the 
Law: The Goldstone Report, Gaza and Lawfare, 43 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 279, 292–95 (2011) 
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from tours of Gaza supervised by Hamas, classified air strikes on Gaza 
police stations as disproportionate measures under the law of war, even 
though the report’s drafters acknowledged that “a great number of the 
Gaza policemen were recruited among Hamas supporters or members of 
Palestinian armed groups.”212 In fact, a veteran member of Al Qassam, 
Hamas’s military wing, stated to a journalist that “two-thirds of Hamas 
policemen are police by day and Al Qassam by night.”213 This lopsided 
ratio demonstrates that the Goldstone investigators were unduly 
credulous in accepting Hamas’s claim that “the Gaza police were a 
civilian law-enforcement agency.”214 The heavy percentage of Hamas-
affiliated individuals suggests that the remainder served as human shields 
in a sophisticated, but ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to immunize 
strategic targets from attack. 
Information asymmetries made the Hamas wager worthwhile. While 
human shields violate international law,215 a government force opposing 
the DFTO must prove the elusive proposition that a targeted site 
contained combatants. DFTOs can readily move personnel and mortars 
to frustrate this effort. In contrast, one photograph proves that an 
opposing government force attacked the structure’s site. Viewed ex ante, 
inquests like the Goldstone Report give a DFTO two chances to succeed: 
A government force will either forego a legitimate target or follow 
through and risk global discredit.216 The plaintiffs in HLP, whatever their 
intent, wished to provide training that would have aided DFTOs’ 
 
(critiquing the Goldstone Report). 
 212. See Goldstone Report, supra note 211, ¶ 34. Some Israeli actions during the Gaza campaign 
were violations of the law of war. See Isabel Kershner, Israel Rebukes 2 in Attack on U.N. Complex, 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 2010, at A4 (discussing Israeli reprimands of senior officers who had directed the 
firing of artillery that hit a United Nations compound in Gaza). 
 213. See Kristen Chick, In Gaza, Rise of Hamas Military Wing Complicates Reconciliation with 
Fatah, Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 4, 2010, at 14; cf. Hamas Asserts Role in Suicide Bombing, Wash. 
Post., Feb. 6, 2008, at A14 (detailing assertions by Gaza officials that an Israeli attack on a police 
station in retaliation for a suicide bombing killed police officers and Al Qassam members). 
 214. See Goldstone Report, supra note 211, ¶ 34.  
 215. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 28, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 (“The presence of a protected person may not be used to render certain 
points or areas immune from military operations.”); Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, 
art. 8, § 2(b)(xxiii), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (“Utilizing the presence of a civilian or other 
protected person to render certain points, areas or military forces immune from military operations 
[constitutes a war crime.]”); see also Eyal Benvinisti, Human Dignity in Combat: The Duty to Spare 
Enemy Civilians, 39 Isr. L. Rev. 81, 104 (2006) (analyzing international humanitarian law provisions); 
Emanuel Gross, Use of Civilians as Human Shields: What Legal and Moral Restrictions Pertain to a 
War Waged by a Democratic State Against Terrorism?, 16 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 445, 455 (2002) (same). 
Hezbollah also has used human shields. See Greg Myre, Offering Video, Israel Answers Critics on War, 
N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 2006, at A1 (describing evidence of Hezbollah rocket placements in population 
centers). 
 216. See LaFree & Dugan, supra note 197, at 422 (“A particular terrorist group may gain utility 
from political instability . . . . [that] results either if the government appears ineffective in curbing 
[terrorist] acts or if the government overreacts and appears repressive and brutal.”). 
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exploitation of such asymmetries in information.217 The U.S. has a 
compelling interest in thwarting DFTOs’ “heads I win, tails you lose” 
strategy. 
The manipulation of international humanitarian law that bore fruit 
in the Goldstone Report is hardly an isolated example. In his HLP 
opinion, Chief Justice Roberts observed that DFTOs had effectively 
taken over administration of refugee camps from the United Nations, 
exploiting the camps’ protected status to prepare for additional attacks.218 
The PLO used a United Nations training center during the Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon in the 1980s.219 Terrorist groups also have 
successfully lobbied for additions to the Geneva Convention that allow 
them to operate with impunity. By supplanting the traditional 
international humanitarian law requirements that combatants wear 
uniforms, observe a fixed command structure, and display arms openly,220 
Geneva’s Additional Protocol I impedes governmental compliance with 
the duty to avoid harm to innocents.221 In addition, new guidelines from 
the International Committee of the Red Cross recommend protection for 
individuals who provide substantial support to violence.222 The guidelines, 
 
 217. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2729 (2010). 
 218. Id. at 2729–30 (“[T]he United Nations . . . was forced to close a Kurdish refugee camp in 
northern Iraq because the camp had come under the control of the PKK and the PKK had ‘failed to 
respect the camp’s neutral and humanitarian nature.’” (quoting McKune Affidavit, supra note 187, at 
135–36) (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Rony Brauman, Darfur: The International Criminal 
Court Is Wrong, Medecins Sans Frontieres (Sept. 2010), http://www.msf-crash.org/drive/8230-rb-
2010-darfur-the-icc-is-wrong-(uk-p4).pdf (“[Darfur refugee] camps were also—as is always the case—a 
refuge for the rebel movements, which gained influence and resources.”). 
 219. See Jack I. Garvey, Rethinking Refugee Aid: A Path for Middle East Peace, 20 Tex. Int’l L.J. 
247, 252 (1985) (asserting that this was an isolated occurrence, while acknowledging more generally 
that the availability of United Nations aid removed the incentive to temper extremist demands). The 
PLO, or Palestine Liberation Organization, engaged in terrorist attacks in Israel and Europe for 
decades; after negotiations with Israel in 1993 and the 1994 signing of a joint Declaration of Principles 
at the White House, its leadership assumed control of the newly created Palestinian Authority, which 
at that time was assigned partial responsibility for administration of the West Bank and Gaza. See 
Amos N. Guiora, Negotiating Implementation of a Peace Agreement: Lessons Learned from Five Years 
at the Negotiating Table, 11 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol. 411, 414 (2010). 
 220. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 1, ¶ 4, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
(conferring lawful combatant status on those who commit violence in the course of “fighting against 
colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes”). For discussion of the enactment 
of this provision, see Michael A. Newton, Exceptional Engagement: Protocol I and a World United 
Against Terrorism, 45 Tex. Int’l L.J. 323, 344–47 (2009). 
 221. See Blank, supra note 211, at 290 (noting that if government forces believe that apparent 
civilians may attack them, those forces will be “more likely to view those who appear to be civilians as 
dangerous and respond accordingly”). 
 222. See Nils Melzer, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law 53–54 (2009) 
(asserting that one who assembles an improvised explosive device (“IED”), like a civilian working at a 
munitions factory, does not cause direct harm and would not be considered a direct participant). 
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which many participating experts opposed,223 would limit the ability of 
government forces to target a trucker knowingly transporting explosives 
for a terrorist group.224 The prospect of such manipulation should not bar 
U.S. citizens or residents from participation in drafting international 
guidelines as independent scholars or representatives of humanitarian 
organizations.  However, participants who act as agents for a DFTO lend 
terrorist organizations an unfair advantage that the Constitution does not 
require.225 
2. Regulating Incentives to Promote Cooperation 
Minimizing a DFTO’s exploitation of information asymmetries also 
yields a renewed chance for cooperation among national and international 
actors. In his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts rightly identified this ex ante 
perspective as crucial, noting the importance of “‘international 
cooperation . . . for an effective response to terrorism.’”226 The 
comprehensive framework enacted by Congress creates incentives for 
deliberation and reciprocity by both foreign organizations and the 
governments they oppose.227 The ability to form relationships with U.S. 
citizens, residents, and groups is an inducement tendered to groups 
willing to forego the use of violence. Such groups have an opportunity to 
differentiate themselves from extremists and identify themselves as 
organizations that can reach out both to governments they oppose and to 
the international community. 
In such a framework, pragmatic moderation can also become self-
reinforcing. This happens in two sequences. First, pragmatists among 
officials within the government the DFTO opposes can cite the 
 
 223. Id. at 9 (advising that the International Committee’s guidance does not necessarily reflect the 
views of all or even a majority of the experts who were consulted); id. at 53 n.123 (noting specific 
disagreement among experts regarding whether non-state actors who produce IEDs would be 
considered direct participants). 
 224. Id. at 53 (listing transportation of weapons and equipment as an example of indirect 
participation). For criticism of this approach, see Samuel Estreicher, Privileging Asymmetric Warfare? 
Defender Duties Under International Law, 11 Chi. J. Int’l L. 425, 431–37 (2011) (arguing that viewed 
ex ante, unduly rigid restraints on governments defending civilians from terrorist groups enhance 
incentives for terrorists to plan attacks and conceal themselves within civilian populations); Michael N. 
Schmitt, Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law, 47 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 292, 315–22 
(2009) (discussing the author’s experience as a participant in the International Committee of the Red 
Cross project, and arguing that civilians who voluntarily collude with terrorist groups in an effort to 
shield them can be targeted under the law of war as direct participants in hostilities, but that civilians 
coerced into service are entitled to protection). 
 225. See infra notes 257–67 and accompanying text (providing a narrow definition of 
“coordination” that provides ample room for legitimate, independent activity). 
 226. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 (2010) (quoting the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301(a)(5), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2010))). 
 227. Cf. Kydd & Walter, Sabotaging the Peace, supra note 191, at 278–89 (arguing that terrorist 
groups such as Hamas use extremist violence to undermine dialogue). 
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organization’s peaceful methods as a basis for reciprocal moves by the 
government. Cultivating habits of nonviolence gives moderates within 
the government more credibility and discredits hawks.228 Second, once 
moderate opposition groups extract concessions through a persistent 
resort to peaceful methods, groups elsewhere see the virtues of such 
methods and follow suit.229 Reciprocity of this kind builds habits of 
deliberation that promote peace. 
In addition to providing ex ante incentives for coordination between 
foreign governments and dissident groups, the statute also frames rules 
of the road between those governments and the U.S. As John Marshall 
recognized more than two centuries ago, other countries may regard us 
with a wariness that echoes our perception of an uncertain world.230 The 
U.S. has long cultivated alliances to protect its own national interests. 
Offering reciprocal protection to our allies gives them an incentive to 
deter groups that target the U.S.231 Since the U.S. has allies in sensitive 
regions of the world, pursuing effective counterterrorism policy through 
criminal law can reduce the risk that allies will seek American military 
intervention to cope with terrorist violence.232 Moreover, reciprocity can 
gain the U.S. more leverage in persuading obdurate allies to respect 
human rights.233 In addition, an effective criminal counterterrorism policy 
will diminish the need for other measures that complicate the U.S.’s 
international standing, including detention of suspected terrorists under 
the laws of war and military commissions.234 While ex ante arguments 
 
 228. This development reverses the cycle of violence described by commentators. Cf. Kydd & 
Walter, supra note 29, at 69–70 (describing a cycle in which terrorist attacks provoke government 
responses that radicalize moderates who previously opposed terrorist methods). 
 229. Cf. Jane Stromseth, Post-Conflict Rule of Law Building: The Need for a Multi-Layered, 
Synergistic Approach, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1443, 1465–66 (2008) (discussing “demonstration 
effects” yielded by efforts to promote the rule of law in sites of mass atrocities such as Sierra Leone). 
 230. See 10 Annals of Cong. 614–15 (1800). 
 231. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2726–27 (2010) (discussing the 
importance of persuading allies such as Turkey, which has long sought to stop violence by the PKK, 
that the U.S. shares their concerns); see also United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 74 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(analyzing the provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that authorize surveillance upon 
a finding by a court that the target of surveillance is an agent for a foreign group seeking to “carry out 
raids against other nations”). 
 232. Cf. Michael N. Schmitt, “Change Direction” 2006: Israeli Operations in Lebanon and the 
International Law of Self-Defense, 29 Mich. J. Int’l L. 127, 131 (2008) (discussing Hezbollah’s 1983 
attack on U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, after President Reagan sent Marines as a peacekeeping force). 
 233. See, e.g., Peter Nicholas et al., Unrest in Egypt: A Rebuffed U.S. Turns to Egypt’s Army in the 
Crisis, L.A. Times, Feb. 3, 2011, at A1 (noting contacts between Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Egyptian military to ensure a peaceful response to the protests that 
ultimately brought down the Mubarak regime). 
 234. See generally Benjamin Wittes, Detention and Denial: The Case for Candor After 
Guantanamo (2010) (favoring more straightforward acknowledgment and codification of detention 
policy); Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military 
Detention Models, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1079 (2008) (discussing parallels and differences between models 
of adjudication); Kevin E. Lunday & Harvey Rishikof, Due Process Is a Strategic Choice: Legitimacy 
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would not suffice to justify the suppression of ideas, managing information 
asymmetries and developing rules of the road are ample bases here, as in 
the pretrial-publicity context, for regulating agency relationships.235 
3. Flaws in the Court’s Hybrid Approach 
However, the HLP Court’s approach to hybrid scrutiny has two 
significant flaws, each of which could have been avoided. The first flaw is 
largely linguistic: Chief Justice Roberts’s language invited confusion 
about the First Amendment status of lending “legitimacy” to violence. 
The second flaw is methodological: The opinion heralded a sweeping 
deference to the government’s assertions about the harm caused by 
agency relationships with DFTOs. Although neither flaw is fatal to the 
opinion, each caused mixed signals that distracted from the Court’s 
pragmatic goals. 
The linguistic flaw arose because Chief Justice Roberts did not 
adequately distinguish between functional and ideational senses of 
lending “legitimacy” to DFTOs. Most of the opinion used the term in a 
functional sense, asserting that material support “lend[s] legitimacy to 
foreign terrorist groups . . . that makes it easier for these groups 
to . . . recruit members, and to raise funds.”236 Chief Justice Roberts’s 
functional argument fits the age-old logic of agency. Consider the 
example of an author who wants to secure a book contract. The author 
has a choice: She could either have an independent person post a review 
of her manuscript on a literary website, or she could retain an agent who 
would confer with her and then approach publishers with whom the 
agent had a prior course of dealing. Surely most, if not all, authors would 
choose option B, because of the benefits offered by an experienced 
person who can integrate the author’s wishes and strengths into a 
marketing pitch. So it is with a DFTO, which also appreciates the benefit 
of a relationship with an individual whose activities the DFTO directs, 
controls, or coordinates. Distinguished officials, such as members of 
Congress, spend a great deal of their time raising money; terrorist groups 
pursue this purpose no less avidly.237 Like political candidates, terrorist 
groups prefer to work with those whose activities they can control. An 
 
and the Establishment of an Article III National Security Court, 39 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 87 (2008) 
(arguing for the creation of a national security tribunal to promote legitimacy); Matthew C. Waxman, 
Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 108 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1365 (2008) (offering criteria and procedures for detention); Zabel & Benjamin, supra note 161 
(analyzing the effectiveness of federal courts in handling terrorism cases). 
 235. Regulating relationships in this fashion requires safe harbors for protected expression, which I 
address in Part IV. 
 236. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2725 (2010). 
 237. See Williams, supra note 149, at 138–39 (discussing the fundraising activities of the LTTE, 
including drug and human trafficking, extortion, and credit-card fraud). 
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agent who allows the DFTO to maximize the rewards of defection 
certainly fits within this rubric. 
However, Chief Justice Roberts’s language also could be read to 
suggest the ideational sense of lending legitimacy, as in the argument of 
any speaker that a DFTO was a worthy group that had been vilified or 
misunderstood. Justice Breyer’s dissent was absolutely correct that this 
justification for regulation lacks a “natural stopping place.”238 This latter 
sense does not fit the logic of the decision, which exempted such 
independent advocacy.239 However, use of the term “legitimacy” invited 
uncertainty about the decision’s scope and consequences. Since the term 
played no functional role in the Court’s analysis, Chief Justice Roberts 
easily could have eschewed its use and simply explained in practical 
terms how agents, whatever their intent, can help a DFTO reap rewards 
from defection. The opinion’s use of the term was a self-inflicted wound 
of the kind that a court should avoid, particularly in a decision whose 
holding predictably will arouse controversy. 
The more serious flaw is a methodological one: the opinion displays 
a deference to the government’s claims that is both unnecessary to the 
decision and inconsistent with the heightened scrutiny that the Court 
adopts. Heightened scrutiny probes the government’s rationale and the 
fit between that rationale and the means the government has chosen. 
This usually requires some independent confirmation of the 
government’s views—otherwise the government becomes the judge of its 
own case. However, the opinion relies principally on a government 
affidavit filed over ten years before the Court’s decision240 and cites only 
three independent sources.241 This is a thin predicate for limiting speech, 
even in the discrete form authorized by the Court’s opinion. While courts 
vary widely in the support they provide for empirical propositions, the 
 
 238. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2736 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 239. Id. at 2721 (majority opinion) (ruling that the statute “does not cover independent advocacy”). 
 240. See id. at 2725–30 (majority opinion) (citing McKune Affidavit, supra note 187, at 135). 
McKune submitted his affidavit in 1998. While the Court takes the record as it finds it, the passage of 
time suggests the wisdom of citing more up-to-date sources from the vast social science literature on 
terrorism. See, e.g., Kydd & Walter, supra note 29 (discussing strategies terrorists employ). 
 241. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2725 (citing Levitt, supra note 26, at 2–3); id. at 2726 
(citing Brief for Anti-Defamation League as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents 19–29, Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (No. 08-1498), 2009 WL 4074856); id. at 2729 (citing 
Marcus, supra note 148). This list is even more sparse than an initial impression might suggest. While 
amicus briefs are helpful to the Court, an amicus brief supporting the government may lack the 
independence or reliability of scholarly work. Similarly, while Levitt’s book on Hamas is useful, Levitt 
had formerly served as a Treasury Department official regulating the financial dealings of DFTOs. See 
Steven Erlanger, Militant Zeal: A Terrorism Expert Analyzes the Palestinian Group Hamas, and What 
Should Be Done About It, N.Y. Times Book Rev., June 25, 2006, at 10 (reviewing Levitt, supra note 
26). For more on deference and fact finding, see Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 
95 Va. L. Rev. 1361, 1404–19 (2009) (arguing for a more nuanced deference that considers both 
institutional competence and whether the government utilized competence in a particular case). 
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Court offered more support in HLP’s closest analog, the pretrial-
publicity context.242 Despite the safe harbors that HLP provided, the 
decision’s studied paucity of support for the government’s arguments 
may prompt legislation even closer to the constitutional line. 
The deference heralded in the opinion is also troubling because it 
counters a prudential judging rule that Chief Justice Roberts had earlier 
practiced: the norm that a court should generally decide cases on the 
narrowest grounds possible.243 To be sure, this prudential norm cannot 
govern every situation. However, by following it the Court can minimize 
the externalities that flow from its decisions and can stick as close to the 
facts of disputes as possible. That connection with the facts underlying a 
dispute is the courts’ distinctive advantage over the more free-wheeling 
deliberations of the other branches. Reaching out to decide an issue 
truncates debate that could enrich the Court’s perspective. Here, ample 
independent authority supported the government’s view that assistance 
in negotiation or training in international law would heighten the 
information asymmetries that already favor DFTOs.244 The Court’s 
failure to mine this authority undermined the perceived legitimacy of the 
decision, obscuring its essential architecture as a blend of discrete 
regulation and capacious safe harbors. It is to that second feature of the 
decision that we now turn. 
IV.  Providing Safe Harbors for Challenging Government 
While limits on agency relationships with DFTOs reduce 
asymmetries of information in foreign affairs, restrictions that sweep too 
broadly have an opposite but equally pernicious effect: they increase 
asymmetries of information at home. Sweeping restrictions limit the 
information available to the public and the ability to challenge 
government policies. HLP addressed these concerns through statutory 
interpretation that echoed the Cold War Court’s use of the avoidance 
canon. The decision constructed a safe harbor by reading the statute 
narrowly to protect independent advocacy, scholarship, journalism, 
 
 242. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 356–62 (1966) (citing a wide spectrum of support, 
including newspaper editorials, University of Missouri publications, and the Warren Commission). 
 243. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(“The court will not ‘formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise 
facts to which it is to be applied.’” (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. Steamship Co. v. Comm’rs of 
Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885))); cf. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2512–
13 (2009) (holding, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, that because an electoral district did not 
pursue a statutory option to “bail out” of the preclearance requirement of section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act, the Court did not have to decide whether the pre-clearance requirement was 
constitutional). But see Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 917–21 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring) (arguing that comprehensive overruling of precedent was necessary in a campaign-finance 
case, since a narrow holding would not remedy the problem). 
 244. See supra notes 190–209 and accompanying text. 
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human rights monitoring, and legal representation. However, the Court’s 
work was marred by conclusory treatment of the plaintiffs’ vagueness 
claims. 
Just as the Court had invoked the avoidance canon in the 1950s to 
temper Cold War statutes that suppressed political ideas, Chief Justice 
Roberts read § 2339B to allow speech-related activity that did not stem 
from an agency relationship with the DFTO.245 After the Court’s decision 
in Brandenburg, the protection of independent advocacy has been at the 
core of free speech. To assert her voice, each individual can stand up on 
an actual or virtual soapbox and proclaim her views to an attentive (or 
indifferent) audience. Of course, in a nation where some can afford more 
access to a megaphone, the individual’s voice may not prevail.246 But the 
Court’s interpretation of § 2339B left unchanged an individual’s right to 
opine on a DFTO such as Hamas, the PKK, or the LTTE: Any speaker is 
free to assert that each or every group was benevolent, nonviolent, or not 
violent enough. 
However, the Court’s decision left questions about speech that 
neither emerges from an agency relationship nor is wholly independent 
in the “soapbox” sense. Scholars, journalists, and human rights groups 
were troubled that Chief Justice Roberts declined to specify how much 
“coordination” with a DFTO would yield a violation of the statute.247 
Each of these actors may engage in some contact with a DFTO. For 
example, a scholar who studies a DFTO may wish to interview DFTO 
leaders to provide focus and detail for her account. A journalist may wish 
to do the same in the course of reporting on the DFTO’s activities, as will 
a human rights group investigating abuses committed by governments 
and non-state actors. If any contact renders such activity “coordinated” 
with the DFTO under the statute, many organizations will face 
substantial legal exposure.248 
The Court’s initial response to these concerns was inauspicious. The 
opinion substituted conclusions for analysis in asserting that the statutory 
terms “training” and “expert advice” were not vague as applied. The 
plaintiffs had argued that these terms provided insufficient guidance 
 
 245. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2721–22 (2010). 
 246. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per curiam) (rejecting the argument that a 
prohibition on independent political expenditures could be justified by the government’s interest in 
“equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections”). 
 247. See, e.g., Amanda Shanor, Beyond Humanitarian Law Project: Promoting Human Rights in a 
Post-911 World, 34 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 519, 533–34 (2011) (discussing concerns of journalists 
and other groups); Scott Atran & Robert Axelrod, Why We Talk to Terrorists, N.Y. Times, June 30, 
2010, at A31 (expressing concern that HLP will hinder scholarship). 
 248. See Zick, The First Amendment in Transborder Perspective, supra note 6, at 948 (arguing that 
the HLP decision could impede “peace-building efforts” by American citizens working in Afghanistan 
and elsewhere). 
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about the legality of instructing DFTOs in the use of international law.249 
Chief Justice Roberts noted that the plaintiffs themselves had used these 
terms in their pleadings.250 However, as the plaintiffs had consistently 
argued that the terms were vague, this observation merely highlighted 
the question of what the statutory language meant. In particular, the 
plaintiffs were concerned about discerning the dividing line between 
training in a “specific skill,” which the statute prohibits, and training that 
entails “general” instruction, which the statute permits.251 Chief Justice 
Roberts’s only direct answer was that vagueness doctrine’s “person of 
ordinary intelligence” would understand that training in the use of 
international law “to peacefully resolve disputes” involves a “specific 
skill,” and thus falls within the statute’s prohibition.252 However, the 
opinion failed to make clear whether this congruence with ordinary 
perception flowed from the functional effect of the interaction between 
teacher and student on the DFTO’s operations, or from the substantive 
difficulty of the subject matter. 
The functional-substantive distinction was central to the question of 
vagueness, as it was to the First Amendment status of speech that 
enhanced a DFTO’s “legitimacy.”253 The functional usage of “training” 
would prohibit much teaching that involves such interaction,254 but would 
provide plain guidance to those affected. The substantive sense, however, 
lacks such clarity, because basic knowledge can be imparted on virtually 
any subject: witness the ubiquity of Wikipedia, which indeed has an entry 
on international law.255 Presumably, sending a representative of a DFTO 
a link to Wikipedia would not trigger prosecution, but a purely 
substantive meaning of teaching or instruction makes that assessment a 
guess about prosecutors’ proclivities, not a product of legal analysis.256 
 
 249. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2721. 
 250. Id. at 2720–21. 
 251. Id. at 2721. 
 252. Id. (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114–15 (1972)). 
 253. See supra note 236 and accompanying text. 
 254. At oral argument, Justice Sotomayor suggested that Congress could not have intended to 
prohibit teaching a skill wholly unrelated to the DFTO’s activities, such as playing the harmonica. See 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) (No. 08-1498) 
[hereinafter HLP Argument]. Then-Solicitor General Kagan responded that the harmonica was really 
a red herring, since “there are not a whole lot of people going around trying to teach Al-Qaeda how to 
play harmonica.” Id. Justice Scalia hinted at the breadth of the functional concept, observing that 
“Mohamed Atta and his harmonica quartet might tour the country and make a lot of money.” Id. 
 255. See International Law, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_law (last visited 
Dec. 23, 2011). 
 256. The majority declined to address other examples, such as teaching geography, cited by the 
plaintiffs to show the vagueness of the language in § 2339B. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 
2721. According to the majority, these examples were purely hypothetical because the plaintiffs had 
not indicated an interest in teaching geography. Id. Therefore, the majority asserted, discussion of such 
hypotheticals had no relevance to a preenforcement challenge, where the relevant conduct was the 
precise activity that the plaintiffs wished to perform, as noted in their complaint. Id.  
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A. Addressing Vagueness by Requiring an Agency Relationship 
While Chief Justice Roberts could have offered clearer guidance on 
the plaintiffs’ plans, his opinion read as a whole identified the functional 
sense as a blueprint for future decisions. The opinion signaled that 
“training” and the other types of human capital in § 2339B hinge on 
interaction between the defendant and a DFTO that approximates an 
agency relationship. The primary indication that courts should look for 
an agency relationship emerged in the discussion of the statutory term 
“service.” For Chief Justice Roberts, service resembled agency as a 
relationship or course of conduct that implies direction and control by 
another. The opinion reinforced this view by citing the dictionary 
definition of service as “the performance of work commanded or paid for 
by another: a servant’s duty: attendance on a superior” or “an act done 
for the benefit or at the command of another.”257 This definition tracks 
the common law definition of agency.258 Chief Justice Roberts also 
suggested at two points in the opinion that the various prohibited forms 
of material support have common attributes.259 Given this view, the 
indicia of service also should inform definitions of “training” and “expert 
advice.” 
From this perspective, training prohibited by the statute should 
entail some kind of interactive relationship with the group. For example, 
a DFTO, such as Hamas, that wished to exploit an agent’s knowledge of 
international humanitarian law would pose specific questions about the 
percentage of operatives it could safely house at a supposedly “civilian” 
site to maintain the site’s legal protection from attack. Any answer other 
than “zero percent” would give Hamas a tactical advantage, by 
encouraging it to continue using civilians as human shields for its 
operatives.260 Whatever the trainer’s intent, Congress has a legitimate 
interest in barring such interaction. In contrast, merely providing a group 
 
 257. Id. (citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2075 (1993)); see also id. at 2722 
(defining “service” to include activity “performed in coordination with, or at the direction of” a 
DFTO). 
 258. See supra note 49. An inference from another of the statute’s definitions also points to a 
narrow definition of service. Congress defined the term “personnel” to exclude independent advocacy. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h) (2010) (“Individuals who act entirely independently of the foreign terrorist 
organization to advance its goals or objectives shall not be considered to be working under the foreign 
terrorist organization’s direction and control.”). Anyone who provides a service could plausibly be 
viewed as “personnel.” As Chief Justice Roberts noted, Congress’s carve out of independent advocacy 
in defining “personnel” would not make sense if Congress viewed independent advocacy as a 
prohibited “service.” Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2722. 
 259. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2722 (asserting that “service,” like “lodging,” 
“weapons,” “explosives,” and “transportation,” cannot be supplied “independently” of a DFTO); see 
id. at 2718 (concluding that all prohibited forms of material support should require the same level of 
intent). 
 260. See Blank, supra note 211, at 290–91. 
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with a widely available book, such as an international law treatise by 
Grotius or Vattel, would not meet the test. 
In addition, under the statute training must be provided to a DFTO, 
such as the PKK or Hamas.261 As Chief Justice Roberts explained, “use of 
the word ‘to’ indicates a connection” between the service and the 
DFTO.262 In other words, the training cannot merely be instruction that a 
defendant provides to a broadly heterogeneous group, even if that group 
includes some members of a DFTO. To demonstrate this connection, the 
government should have to show that the defendant had accepted 
payment from the DFTO for this purpose, or offered the training at the 
DFTO’s request in a forum that the DFTO sponsors. This kind of 
DFTO-sponsored forum offers the maximum opportunity for the 
manipulation that Congress wished to combat. 
The avoidance canon strengthens the case for narrow definitions of 
“training” and “expert advice.” As Chief Justice Roberts noted, Congress 
expressly exempted independent advocacy because it wished to steer 
clear of constitutional difficulties.263 Any workable test, therefore, must 
clearly distinguish between independent advocacy and prohibited conduct. 
Such a test would have to require more than the mere existence of 
contacts with a DFTO. The government conceded in HLP that § 2339B 
did not “prevent [the plaintiffs] from becoming members of [a DFTO] or 
impose any sanction on them for doing so.”264 However, even a symbolic 
species of membership, which does not include payment of membership 
dues, involves nominal contacts with the DFTO. A test keyed to contacts 
would thus clash with the statute’s membership carve out.265 
If mere contacts alone cannot destroy the safe harbor of 
independent advocacy, courts need a distinct test to provide guidance 
and avoid the problem of vagueness.266 The agency concept fills the gap. 
 
 261. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2721–22 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1)). 
 262. Id. at 2722. A simple coincidence of views, without more, between a speaker and a DFTO 
should not suffice to demonstrate the kind of connection required. Neither should agreement, tacit or 
express, on political goals. In this sense, the standard under § 2339B is more demanding, for instance, 
than the standard for price-fixing in antitrust law. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 
U.S. 752, 764 (1984) (holding that a violation requires “unity of purpose or a common design and 
understanding”); Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Dist. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540–41 (1954) 
(noting that “conscious parallelism” is evidence of a violation, but is not sufficient in and of itself). 
 263. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2723. 
 264. Id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 265. This conclusion dovetails with the Cold War avoidance cases. In Rowoldt v. Perfetto, for 
example, the Court required that when the government seeks to deport a noncitizen, it must show a 
“meaningful association” with the Communist Party. 355 U.S. 115, 120 (1957). The Court pointedly 
declined to find such a link, even where the petitioner had joined the Party and briefly had run a 
business that the Party sponsored. Id. at 117–18. 
 266. The vagueness doctrine requires that the statute set a boundary between lawful and unlawful 
conduct that is discernible by a “person of ordinary intelligence.” See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 
408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). 
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It informs the test with a centuries-long pedigree in common law and, 
through its link to “service,” an anchor in Chief Justice Roberts’s 
opinion.267 
These narrow definitions of “training” and “service” also deal with a 
concern, raised by critics of the HLP decision, that prosecutors could 
now target journalistic decisions, such as a newspaper’s decision to 
publish an op-ed piece by a Hamas leader purporting to announce a 
cease-fire.268 Under the narrow definition posited above, categorizing this 
journalistic decision as “material support” would be problematic. 
Starting with the law’s protection for independent advocacy illustrates 
the point. Under the statute, an individual with a copy of the Hamas 
leader’s speech could stand on a soapbox in the public square and praise 
the speech profusely. In contrast, the newspaper’s publication of the 
piece would carry no such express or implicit endorsement, since 
newspapers routinely print op-ed pieces representing a wide spectrum of 
opinion. If the soapbox speaker’s advocacy is independent, the 
newspaper’s activity is even more so. Moreover, the newspaper clearly is 
not providing a service “to” Hamas.269 Instead, the newspaper is 
providing a service to its readers in spurring public debate, as it does with 
the rest of its editorial content. This role also rebuts any claim that the 
newspaper specifically intends to aid Hamas. While publication of the 
op-ed may provide some benefit to Hamas by enabling it to reach an 
audience that would otherwise not consider its views, this benefit is 
purely incidental to the newspaper’s goal of spurring public debate.270 
Similarly, individuals would be free to offer a course on 
international humanitarian law open to students who met neutral 
requirements, such as age, educational prerequisites, or ability to pay. 
 
 267. See United States v. Farhane, 643 F.3d 127, 143–144 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that the statute 
was not vague as applied to a physician who offered to serve as an “on-call doctor” for Al Qaeda). 
Even before HLP, courts had found that the term “service” was “by and large, a word of common 
understanding and one that could not be used for selective or subjective enforcement.” See 
Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 463 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1063 (C.D. Cal. 2006), 
aff’d, 578 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Al Haramain Islamic Found. v. United States (Al 
Haramain I), No. 07-1155, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103373, at *50–52 (D. Ore. Nov. 5, 2009) (finding no 
vagueness in 31 C.F.R. § 594.406(b), which bars unauthorized provision of “legal, accounting, 
financial, brokering, freight forwarding, transportation, public relations, educational, or other 
services”). Courts and agencies have also readily distinguished between coordinated and 
uncoordinated activities in the campaign finance arena. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976) 
(per curiam) (upholding limits on campaign spending coordinated with a candidate, as opposed to 
independent spending). The Court may have erred as a substantive matter in holding that the First 
Amendment bars limits on independent spending; the point here is that a corpus of case law makes 
this distinction. 
 268. See, e.g., Cole, The Roberts Court vs. Free Speech, supra note 6, at 80.  
 269. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2721–22. 
 270. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Espionage Act and National Security Whistleblowing After 
Garcetti, 57 Am. U. L. Rev. 1531, 1546 (2008) (noting the importance of transparency in government 
and the media’s role in promoting that objective). 
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Enrolled students could include students who happened to be members 
of a DFTO. Such a course of study would not violate § 2339B, so long as 
the provider did not restrict enrollment, recruitment, or publicity to 
members of the group. The HLP plaintiffs could also participate in a 
conference cosponsored by both a DFTO and moderate groups. Here, 
too, the more inclusive nature of the audience would rebut a charge that 
the plaintiffs were providing aid “to” a DFTO. Organizations, such as the 
Carter Center, that mediate disputes between governments and non-state 
actors would also comply with the law. Mediation might entail private 
sessions with a DFTO as part of an initial push to persuade the DFTO of 
the value of mediation, or as a technique during mediation to identify 
areas of contention and common ground. Mediation involves mutual 
commitments by the DFTO and the government it opposes and confers 
no special advantage on the DFTO. For this reason, activity reasonably 
related to mediation efforts would not constitute assistance “to a foreign 
terrorist organization.”271 Indeed, by encouraging such cross-over events, 
§ 2339B echoes Justice Stevens’s praise of disclosure requirements in 
Meese v. Keene as promoting “more speech.”272 
B. Straddling the Domestic and International Realms: The Case 
of Specially Designated Global Terrorists 
A narrow interpretation of material support also clarifies an area in 
which domestic and international realms overlap: the regulation of 
specially designated global terrorists (“SDGTs”).273 SDGTs are 
individuals or entities present in this country that the government 
believes have helped funnel money to DFTOs.274 As a result, the 
government blocks the SDGT’s transfer and receipt of assets and 
services.275 As a threshold matter, an individual or entity that wishes to 
assist the SDGT must specify in its preenforcement challenge the 
conduct it wishes to perform.276 As a substantive matter, however, 
 
 271. See Peter Margulies, Accountable Altruism: The Impact of the Federal Material Support Statute 
on Humanitarian Aid, 34 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 539, 556 (2011). 
 272. See 481 U.S. 465, 481 (1986). A clear and capacious safe harbor also serves policy goals, by 
reassuring communities whose cooperation is crucial for effective counterterrorism. Cf. Aziz Z. Huq, 
The Signaling Function of Religious Speech in Domestic Counterterrorism, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 833, 896–97 
(2011) (arguing that the use of religious affiliation as an index of terrorist proclivity is problematic on 
constitutional and policy grounds); Tom R. Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer & Aziz Z. Huq, Legitimacy and 
Deterrence Effects in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 Law & Society Rev. 
365, 372 (2010) (discussing the positive effects of a perception of legitimacy on cooperation with law 
enforcement). See generally Lawrence Rosenthal, The Law Professor as Counterterrorist Tactician, 
89 Tex. L. Rev. 113, 120–21 (2011). 
 273. See 31 C.F.R. § 594.310 (2011) (citing Exec. Order No. 13,224, § 1(d)(i), 3 C.F.R. 786 (2002)) 
(defining “SDGT”). 
 274. See 31 C.F.R. § 594.201–206 (2011). 
 275. See 31 C.F.R. § 594.409 (barring “donation of . . . services” to SDGTs). 
 276. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2722 (2010). 
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because the government has greater control over the SDGT’s funding, 
the fungibility of services is less important than in the international 
realm.277 
In one recent post-HLP decision, Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, 
Inc. v. United States Department of the Treasury, the Ninth Circuit gave 
the plaintiffs too much leeway on the threshold issue, and as a 
substantive matter interpreted a federal regulation too broadly, resulting 
in a finding that the regulation was unconstitutional.278 In Al Haramain, 
the court held that regulations prohibiting material support of SDGTs 
were unconstitutional as applied to a group that asserted at oral 
argument that it wished to conduct joint press conferences with Al-
Haramain to protest its designation.279 Al-Haramain (“AHIF”) had been 
placed on the list because it had used resources to finance rebels in 
Chechnya,280 had carried on its board of directors two individuals who 
had been found to have assisted terrorist groups with financial 
contributions,281 and had been affiliated with a Saudi organization that 
had also contributed financial support to terrorist groups.282 Two issues 
relevant to HLP were present in Al Haramain: (1) whether the plaintiffs 
alleged their planned coordination with AHIF with sufficient specificity 
to support a preenforcement challenge, and (2) whether the court was 
right to hold that the regulations barring material support to a SDGT 
were unconstitutional as applied. I examine each in turn. 
The Al Haramain court failed to provide sufficient guidance on the 
threshold issue of the specificity required of plaintiffs in a 
preenforcement challenge. In HLP, the Supreme Court emphasized that 
plaintiffs in a preenforcement challenge must specifically articulate the 
nature and scope of their proposed coordination with a designated 
entity.283 This “specific articulation”284 by plaintiffs is a proxy for the 
factual predicate that would be available in an appeal from a criminal 
conviction.285 It therefore helps courts avoid issuing advisory opinions in 
 
 277. Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury (Al Haramain II), No. 10-
35032, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19498, at *87–88 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 2011). 
 278. Id. at *95–96. 
 279. Id. at *85. 
 280. Id. at *10–11. 
 281. Id. at *21–28 (affirming the district court’s finding that substantial evidence supported the 
designation); see also Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury (Al Haramain I), 
No. 07-1155, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103373, at *12 (D. Ore. Nov. 5, 2009) (noting the actions of 
director Soliman Al-Buthe, who in March 2000 personally delivered $150,000 in traveler’s checks and 
a cashier’s check from Al Haramain to its Saudi parent under circumstances that supported an 
inference that he intended to provide financial support for terrorist activities in Chechnya). 
 282. Al Haramain II, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19498, at *14–15. 
 283. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2722 (2010). 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. (citing Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 20 (1965)); cf. Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, 
Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 Duke L.J. 1321, 1410 n.332 (2010) (discussing the 
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the preenforcement context.286 The Supreme Court held that some of the 
HLP plaintiffs’ claims, including their plan to “offer their services to 
advocate on behalf of the rights of the Kurdish people,”287 did not 
provide the requisite specificity.288 
The Al Haramain court misapplied the Supreme Court’s standard in 
holding that the plaintiffs in that case had met the “specific articulation” 
test. In their complaint, the plaintiffs had claimed that they wished “to 
speak out . . . in support of AHIF’s designation challenge and . . . work 
on AHIF’s behalf and for its benefit, by speaking to the press, holding 
demonstrations, and contacting the government.”289 This description of 
generalized advocacy offered no more precision than the HLP plaintiffs’ 
plan to speak for “the Kurdish people.”290 Yet the Al Haramain court 
wrongly viewed it as meeting the Supreme Court’s rigorous 
requirements.291 The Al Haramain plaintiffs also averred in their 
appellate brief that they wished to “organiz[e] public education activities 
in conjunction with” AHIF.292 Here, too, however, the plaintiffs failed to 
provide the requisite specificity. Their plans could have entailed 
collaboration on the selection of topics and speakers for public events or 
could have entailed more elaborate coordination, such as reimbursing 
vendors selected by AHIF. The latter activity would have circumvented 
the Treasury Department order blocking AHIF’s spending. The broad 
description in the brief gave no clue about the scope of the coordination 
contemplated. It therefore exacerbated the advisory nature of 
preenforcement challenges in precisely the fashion that the Supreme 
Court sought to avoid.293 At oral argument, plaintiffs’ counsel stated that 
one of his clients wished to coordinate media outreach, including a press 
conference, with AHIF.294 This claim was more specific. However, 
responses at oral argument are too casual and contingent to fend off the 
dangers of advisory opinions to which the Supreme Court alluded in 
HLP.295 
 
temptation for a party to engage in strategic behavior in a preenforcement challenge to administrative 
rules where the factual record is sparse). 
 286. See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990) (holding that a dispute about 
regulations is typically not ripe for adjudication until the regulation has been applied “to the 
claimant’s situation in a fashion that harms or threatens to harm him”). 
 287. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2722. 
 288. Id. at 2729.  
 289. See Complaint at 24, Al Haramain I, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103373 (No. 07-1155). 
 290.  See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2722. 
 291. See Al Haramain II, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19498, at *84. 
 292. Id. at *84–85 (alteration in original). 
 293. See Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2722. 
 294. Al Haramain II, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19498, at *85. 
 295. The Ninth Circuit panel also noted that the government had not asserted that the plaintiffs 
had been insufficiently precise. Id. However, this is not entirely accurate. The government did refer to 
this point at the oral argument. See Oral Argument at 54:00–56:00, Al Haramain II, U.S. App. LEXIS 
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Moving beyond the threshold point of clarity in a preenforcement 
challenge, the Ninth Circuit correctly viewed the First Amendment as 
protecting incidental contact with a SDGT that is reasonably related to 
an independent expression of opinion.296 Consider the modest contact 
mentioned above, involving the selection of topics and speakers for a 
conference on Islam or cosponsorship of a press conference criticizing 
the SDGT’s designation.297 Conveying information to the public about 
Islam is political and religious speech, which the government cannot 
curb.298 In the foreign setting, where the U.S. government cannot control 
a party’s assets, a conference might turn into a fundraising opportunity 
for a terrorist group. In the domestic context, in contrast, once the 
government has issued a blocking order for a SDGT, such opportunities 
evaporate.299 Any goodwill accrued by the SDGT would be useful only in 
prompting reconsideration of the SDGT’s designation—a goal protected 
by the First Amendment. 
Nevertheless, the panel was precipitous in striking down federal 
regulations that bar provision of material support to a SDGT. Because 
any benefit to the SDGT would be incidental to the expression of 
independent political opinion, the court should have invoked the 
avoidance canon and viewed the religious or press conference examples 
as not entailing aid “to” the SDGT within the meaning of the 
regulations.300 The regulations’ reference to “material . . . support . . . to” 
a SDGT301 left abundant room for this narrow reading, which would have 
obviated the extreme step of invalidating the rules. 
C. Lawyers as Agents for Democracy 
This still leaves the question of whether the bar on “expert advice” 
in § 2339B applies to legal advice. Two noted scholars have argued that 
the language and logic of HLP suggests an affirmative answer to this 
question.302 This result, however, would clash with lawyers’ crucial role as 
 
19498 (No. 10-35032), available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_subpage.php?pk_id= 
0000007126. In any case, the issuance of advisory opinions is a jurisdictional flaw, which the court may 
identify on its own, without the prompting of a party. See Gen. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Clark Mall Corp., 
644 F.3d 375, 379 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 296. See Al Haramain II, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19498, at *91. 
 297. Id. at *91–93. 
 298. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969); Stone, supra note 181, at 191–94. 
 299. See Al Haramain II, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19498, at *91–93. 
 300. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2721 (2010) (defining “service” as 
“work commanded or paid for by another”). 
 301. See Exec. Order No. 13224, § 1(d)(i), 3 C.F.R. 786 (2002). 
 302. See Knake, supra note 11, at 656–57 (noting the likely “chilling effect” of the Court’s holding 
in HLP on lawyers’ advice to DFTOs); Tarkington, supra note 63, at 41 (“The [HLP] 
Court . . . forbids [attorneys] from speaking as attorneys to assist others by providing legal advice or 
access to international human rights law.”). 
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intermediaries between the government and the people.303 Prohibiting 
legal advice would conflict with the avoidance canon, the Court’s 
precedents on lawyers, and Chief Justice Roberts’s previously expressed 
views on fairness in adjudication.304 Moreover, the special role of lawyers 
as officers of the court would minimize asymmetries in information 
favoring terrorist groups. In light of these factors, the best reading of 
both HLP and § 2339B would allow a lawyer challenging the terrorist 
designation of a group to provide advice reasonably related to the 
representation, including advice that, if offered by a nonlawyer, could be 
barred. 
The language of the opinion does supply a basis for concern about 
the status of legal advice to DFTOs. Chief Justice Roberts asserted that 
§ 2339B bars communication of “advice derived from ‘specialized 
knowledge’—for example, training on the use of international law.”305 
Looking at this language in isolation might elicit the conclusion that the 
statute bars legal advice of this nature. However, context tells a different 
tale. 
Given the statute’s text, the plaintiffs’ limited claims, and HLP’s 
narrow view of preenforcement challenges, it seems unlikely that Chief 
Justice Roberts believed that his opinion addressed the provision of 
specifically legal advice. As noted above, the Court held that in 
preenforcement challenges it would consider only the precise activity 
that the plaintiffs sought to perform.306 The HLP plaintiffs did not ask the 
Supreme Court to rule that they had the right to provide expressly legal 
advice or to engage in legal representation in agencies or courts.307 Nor 
 
 303. See supra note 85 and accompanying text; see also Rakesh K. Anand, The Role of the Lawyer 
in the American Democracy, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 1611, 1625 (2009). 
 304. See Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1757 (2009) (“[T]he ability to grant interim relief 
is . . . ‘an historic procedure for preserving rights during the pendency of an appeal . . . .’” (quoting 
Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 15 (1942))). 
 305. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2723–24. 
 306. Id. at 2722 (holding that a preenforcement challenge requires more than “speculation” about 
the precise nature of the plaintiffs’ proposed activities). 
 307. While the plaintiffs had sought below to provide “legal expertise” in negotiations between the 
LTTE and the Sri Lankan government, they informed the Court that this claim was moot in light of 
the LTTE’s military defeat. Id. at 2716–17. The plaintiffs did not seek to represent any DFTO in a 
legal challenge to its terrorist designation. Nor did they seek a license to provide legal representation 
and advice pursuant to 31 C.F.R. § 597.505, like the license recently sought and obtained by lawyers 
for the ACLU to bring a lawsuit seeking an injunction against the targeting of Anwar al-Awlaki, an 
American citizen and Muslim cleric living in Yemen and accused of having ties to al Qaeda. See 
Lawyers Win Right to Aid U.S. Target, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 2010, at A13. The ACLU obtained the 
license after al-Awlaki was declared an SDGT. Id. The Court denied the injunction on the grounds 
that the plaintiff, al-Awlaki’s father, lacked standing, and that the matter presented a political 
question. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 35, 52 (D.D.C. 2010). Al-Awlaki was killed in a 
missile attack by CIA-operated drones in September 2011. See Mark Mazzetti et al., C.I.A. Strike Kills 
U.S.-Born Militant in a Car in Yemen, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 2011, at A1. 
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does the statute expressly bar legal advice, although it does prohibit a 
range of other activities.308 
In pondering the future of legal representation of DFTOs, the 
avoidance canon is central. Courts have repeatedly held that legal 
representation serves core First Amendment and due process values, 
acting as a safeguard against arbitrary government action.309 Such 
safeguards are vital in the designation of foreign terrorist organizations, 
which imposes substantial consequences on individuals working with the 
organization. Designation as a foreign terrorist group will deprive an 
organization of the ability to raise money or engage in most agency 
relationships in the U.S. Because courts have declined to review 
designations collaterally in cases under § 2339B,310 individuals who raise 
money or, on the theory embraced by the HLP Court, engage in speech-
related activity as agents of the DFTO face criminal prosecution. 
Designation therefore triggers substantial liberty interests. Congress 
provided for judicial review to ensure that a designation was based on 
substantial evidence. Lawyers for an organization challenging a 
designation vindicate that right with their expertise and judgment. 
While serving in this capacity, lawyers also act as agents of 
constitutionalism itself,311 preserving government from the long-term 
harm that stems from habits of arbitrariness and haste. As the Court held 
in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, excluding lawyers would effectively 
“insulate the Government’s laws from judicial inquiry.”312 Presumably, 
the Court would apply the avoidance canon to reject an interpretation 
with such drastic consequences.313 
 
 308. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2010) (barring training and expert advice and assistance, but 
not expressly prohibiting legal representation). 
 309. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543–48 (2001); cf. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 
412, 428 (1978) (protecting ACLU lawyers’ communications with prospective clients regarding 
constitutional litigation, and noting that, for the ACLU, “‘litigation is not a technique of resolving 
private differences’; it is ‘a form of political expression’ and ‘political association’” (citing NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429, 431 (1963))). See generally Knake, supra note 11 (discussing the First 
Amendment basis for legal representation); Sabbeth, supra note 85 (same); Tarkington, supra note 63 
(same). 
 310. See United States v. Afshari, 426 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 311. See supra notes 82–87 and accompanying text (discussing the lawyer’s role in democracy). 
 312. See 531 U.S. at 545–46. Congress could require lawyers to obtain a license to advise and 
represent DFTOs, as is required to represent SDGTs. See 31 C.F.R. § 597.505 (2011). To meet First 
Amendment requirements, however, such a license would have to be content neutral and available on 
a provisional basis upon the lawyer’s request, at least in cases seeking preliminary relief. See Al-
Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 1 (denying a request for an injunction against an alleged targeted killing 
effort). This would render a licensing requirement for legal representation in a designation challenge 
closer to the requirement of a notice of appearance that every tribunal imposes on lawyers, and to the 
foreign-agent registration requirements that the Court has already upheld. See Meese v. Keene, 481 
U.S. 465, 469–70 (1987); see also supra notes 138–46 and accompanying text (discussing Keene). 
 313. But see Tarkington, supra note 63, at 52–53 (arguing that HLP does apply to legal advice and 
representation). A portion of Justice Breyer’s dissent argued that because the plaintiffs also wished to 
speak before Congress, the majority opinion limited domestic speech. See Holder v. Humanitarian 
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Chief Justice Roberts’s sympathy with this view emerged in his 
opinion in Nken v. Holder, which held that statutory limits on a court’s 
ability to grant a stay of deportation pending adjudication on the merits 
require a clear statement from Congress.314 Congress had imposed severe 
conditions on injunctions regarding deportation.315 The government 
argued that a stay was merely one type of injunction and therefore was 
covered by the restrictions.316 Chief Justice Roberts disagreed, noting that 
a stay of deportation, unlike an injunction, did not require any 
interference with the functioning of the executive branch.317 A stay 
merely gave courts the time necessary to make an orderly and accurate 
decision.318 Modifying this element of courts’ inherent power would 
require a clear statement from Congress.319 Since courts also have the 
power to appoint a legal representative for a party to ensure the fairness 
and accuracy of adjudication,320 a statute that could be read to prohibit 
exercise of this authority would similarly prompt invocation of a clear 
statement rule. 
Even supposing that the Court would read § 2339B as not applying 
to legal representation of a DFTO challenging its designation, related 
 
Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2732 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). However, the majority declined to 
reach the issue of whether § 2339B could constitutionally limit advocacy or the provision of 
information to Congress. See id. at 2722 (majority opinion) (holding only that the plaintiffs had not 
provided a sufficiently concrete description of advocacy before Congress to prevail in a 
preenforcement challenge). On Congress’s wide latitude in seeking information, see Eastland v. U.S. 
Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975) (reaffirming the broad discretion of Congress in 
investigations), and compare Kathleen Clark, Congress’s Right to Counsel in Intelligence Oversight, 
2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 915, 951–59 (arguing that members of Congress on intelligence committees have a 
constitutional right to advice from staff lawyers, even though legislation limits access to sensitive 
information to members themselves). Justice Breyer did note the government’s insistence that filing an 
amicus brief would constitute material support. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2736 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). But see infra notes 321–28 and accompanying text (arguing that the Court’s reasoning 
would protect the submission of amicus briefs). The Court has on at least one occasion held that a 
claimant’s interest in receipt of government benefits is a property interest that does not require the 
same solicitude for the attorney’s role as in cases involving liberty interests. See Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n 
of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 332–33 (1985) (upholding limits on attorney’s fees in veteran’s 
benefit cases, while acknowledging that such limits might not be appropriate in a case involving 
welfare benefits necessary for subsistence). However, the liberty interests at stake in designation cases 
are of far greater magnitude. Moreover, the statute at issue in Walters only limited legal fees; it did not 
bar pro bono legal representation or restrict the lawyer’s substantive arguments. 
 314. 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1759–60 (2009). 
 315. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(2) (2010) (“[N]o court shall enjoin the removal of any alien pursuant to 
a final order under this section unless the alien shows by clear and convincing evidence that the entry 
or execution of such order is prohibited as a matter of law.”). 
 316. Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1756. 
 317. Id. at 1757–59. 
 318. See id. at 1757 (“The choice for a reviewing court should not be between justice on the fly or 
participation in what may be an ‘idle ceremony.’” (quoting Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 
U.S. 4, 10 (1942))). 
 319. Id. at 1757–60. 
 320. See In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 647 (1985). 
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issues prompt further questions. One question addressed at the HLP 
argument but reserved in the Court’s decision was the filing of an amicus 
brief on behalf of a DFTO. The other is the scope of advice that a lawyer 
could provide in the course of representing a DFTO challenging its 
designation. 
The amicus-brief issue first received notice at the Ninth Circuit, 
when the government argued that filing an amicus brief in support of a 
DFTO would constitute material support.321 While the Ninth Circuit 
viewed such a prohibition as constitutionally infirm,322 then-Solicitor 
General Kagan reiterated the government’s view during the Supreme 
Court argument.323 Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion did not resolve the 
issue. The Chief Justice noted that the plaintiffs had not indicated their 
intention to file an amicus brief, making analysis premature in the 
context of a preenforcement challenge.324 However, Chief Justice Roberts 
did not quarrel with the Ninth Circuit’s view that filing an amicus brief 
for a DFTO could constitute “protected advocacy.”325 
Amicus briefs also fare well in the balancing of information 
asymmetries. An amicus brief does not merely help the group submitting 
the brief; it helps the court as well. A well-written amicus brief provides 
insights that the court might not obtain from the parties to the case. A 
DFTO such as the Iranian group MEK, which has on occasion enjoyed 
the protection of the U.S. government,326 could offer a useful perspective 
to a court reviewing the government’s designation of another 
organization. In contrast, no information asymmetries favoring DFTOs 
flow from permitting amicus briefs. Amicus briefs address questions of 
law, decided by courts. As in the pretrial publicity setting, courts are able 
to cull the wheat from the chaff. Submission of an amicus brief therefore 
entails the same minimal risk of deception or manipulation as public 
comments before a bench trial.327 A court can deny permission to a group 
 
 321. Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 930 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 322. Id. 
 323. HLP Argument, supra note 254, at 47–51 (arguing that the statute would bar a DFTO from 
“hir[ing] a lawyer to write an amicus brief on its behalf” but that a lawyer could independently submit 
an amicus brief that happened to coincide with the DFTO’s views); see also id. at 51 (acknowledging 
constitutional claims regarding the right to counsel in certain criminal, habeas, and civil cases, and 
suggesting that the statute should be read to preserve such rights). 
 324. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2719 (2010). 
 325. Id. (quoting Mukasey, 552 F.3d at 930). 
 326. See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 613 F.3d 220, 225 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(noting, in the course of requiring a more precise explanation from the Secretary of State of evidence 
supporting the designation and an opportunity for the DFTO to rebut this evidence, an Iranian 
dissident DFTO’s claims that it had cooperated with U.S. authorities in Iraq); cf. Tim Arango, Iranian 
Exile Group Poses Vexing Issue for U.S. in Iraq, N.Y. Times, July 23, 2011, at A5 (discussing U.S. 
efforts to persuade members of a group to leave a camp in Iraq after a raid by the Iraqi Army killed 
dozens of camp residents). 
 327. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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whose proposed brief is tendentious and uninformative. Courts have long 
possessed this power, as well as the power to solicit amicus briefs from 
those, including the executive branch, with an interest in a matter.328 As 
in Nken, restricting this option in the court’s repertoire should require a 
clear statement from Congress. 
Since asymmetries in information pose no obstacle, the main 
question is what constitutional values are served by an amicus brief. 
Because an amicus brief does not involve a party whose liberty or 
property are directly at stake, an amicus brief has a weaker link to 
procedural values than the stay that the Nken Court preserved. However, 
if a DFTO includes U.S. citizens who would risk prosecution if a court 
upheld the government’s action, the DFTO’s amicus vindicates those 
citizens’ right to speak and therefore serves First Amendment values that 
a court should respect. 
The question of advice is even more complicated. We have already 
seen that an agent of a DFTO who enhances the group’s reputation for 
caring about the law could help net more cash contributions. However, 
limiting the advice furnished by an attorney assisting the DFTO in a 
challenge to its designation would have adverse consequences for both 
due process and the First Amendment. An attorney might find it difficult 
to represent a DFTO in a challenge to its designation without offering 
advice on related issues. For example, suppose leaders of a DFTO 
suggested that to make the best case for a challenge, they would forsake 
violence. The DFTOs’ leaders then asked the lawyer to advise them on 
whether this shift would affect the posture of international organizations 
such as the United Nations or the legal duties of the government the 
DFTO opposed. Just as the legal-services lawyers in Velazquez could 
only do their job if they could “present all the reasonable and well-
grounded arguments necessary for proper resolution of the case,”329 a 
lawyer for a DFTO would have to provide this advice to meet her duty of 
competence under the American Bar Association’s rules.330 However, 
reading § 2339B to prohibit such advice would expose the lawyer to 
prosecution. Intimidated by the prospect of prosecution for providing 
advice in the course of legal representation, attorneys might fear 
representing DFTOs in challenges to their designations. The logic of 
Velazquez would make this result problematic under the First 
Amendment. Since drawing the line between permissible and 
impermissible representation would be virtually impossible, the statute 
also would be unconstitutionally vague as applied. To resolve these 
 
 328. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General’s Changing Role 
in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 1323, 1354 (2010) (describing the Court’s invitations to 
the Solicitor General to provide the U.S.’s view on whether the Court should grant certiorari). 
 329. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545–46 (2001). 
 330. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.1 (2011). 
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problems, a court should read the statute as allowing advice reasonably 
related to a designation challenge. 
One objection to this dispensation for lawyers might be that it 
renders the statute underinclusive because information on the law 
provided by laypersons can serve the same beneficial purposes. 
However, these arguments ignore the compelling state interests served 
by the lawyer-layperson distinction. As “key participants in 
the . . . justice system,”331 professionals accept obligations, including 
candor toward the tribunal,332 competence,333 and the duty to refrain from 
counseling a client to engage in illegal conduct.334 The inclusion of such 
duties in the canons of legal ethics inspires a higher level of trust for 
lawyers. For example, a lawyer could not advise a DFTO that civilians 
were appropriate targets because they were somehow complicit in 
government repression. Such a dismissal of the many legal protections 
for civilians in domestic and international law would not constitute 
competent legal advice. Similarly, suppose a DFTO leader asked about 
the percentage of operatives it could install at a supposedly “civilian” site 
without compromising the site’s civilian status. Since harboring any 
operatives at the site would constitute use of civilians as human shields, a 
lawyer would have to answer “zero percent.” Finally, like the measures 
that the Court upheld in Milavetz and in Meese v. Keene, allowing 
lawyers to enter into agency relationships with DFTOs combats 
information asymmetries.335 A layperson can conceal her agent status and 
thus appear independent. In contrast, a lawyer who assists a DFTO in 
challenging its designation must disclose her role by filing a notice of 
appearance with the court, as would any other attorney. By listening to a 
lawyer who has disclosed her role, the public can more accurately gauge 
the lawyer’s reliability and discount her claims.336 While such disclosure 
does not eliminate asymmetries in information, it helps narrow these 
gaps and therefore enhances public debate. 
V.  The Virtues of Hybrid Scrutiny 
Adding capacious safe harbors to the rules of the road does not 
shoehorn HLP into the usual doctrinal rubric. HLP stands out in modern 
First Amendment case law; it reaches a different result that is more 
 
 331. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1991). 
 332. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3 (2011). 
 333. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.1 (2011). 
 334. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2(d) (2011). 
 335. See supra notes 60–69 and accompanying text (discussing Milavetz); supra notes 138–46 
(discussing Keene); cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 915–16 (2010) (upholding the 
requirement that independent political advertisements disclose funding sources because “the public 
has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate shortly before an election”). 
 336. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.3 (2011) (requiring lawyers to make “reasonable 
efforts” to inform third parties that the lawyer does not represent their interests). 
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receptive to a limited form of content regulation and cites justifications 
that are less concrete. However, the decision is not the outlier that critics 
claim. It draws from clear strands in the case law as well as methods that 
span disparate doctrines. 
A. The Ubiquity of Ex Ante Justifications 
One feature of HLP is its adoption of an ex ante perspective to 
justify content regulation. For example, the Court found that curbing 
agency relationships with DFTOs will promote international cooperation 
against terrorism.337 Justice Breyer, in dissent, suggested that this brand 
of argument was unduly speculative.338 However, viewed against the 
backdrop of constitutional law in general and First Amendment cases in 
particular, ex ante arguments have a solid pedigree. 
An ex ante perspective poses David Hume’s question: “What must 
become of the world, if such practices prevail? How could society subsist 
under such disorders?”339 While Hume’s central concern in this passage 
was the ruin that would follow from abolition of private property,340 
courts across the landscape of constitutional law fashion rulings that 
frame incentives for compliance with legal norms and reduce negative 
externalities.341 Separation of powers cases, for example, turn on factors 
that will curb overreaching by each of the three branches while ensuring 
a “workable government.”342 As John Marshall noted in his speech to 
Congress, proper framing of these incentives, particularly in the complex 
domain of foreign affairs, sometimes requires that the judiciary stay its 
hand.343 Incentivizing reciprocity among sovereign states also undergirds 
 
 337. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 (2010); supra notes 226–35 and 
accompanying text. 
 338. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2738. 
 339. See David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, 26–27 (Tom L. 
Beauchamp ed., 1998). For a more recent account, see Barbara H. Fried, Ex Ante/Ex Post, 
13 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 123 (2003). 
 340. See Hume, supra note 339, at 96 (noting that the ability to own property “promotes public 
utility and . . . civil society”). Preserving the system of property rights from hasty legislative impulses 
was a central concern of the Framers, as well. See The Federalist No. 78, supra note 83, at 470. 
 341. Justice Breyer’s perspective often takes a pragmatist turn, which does not square with his 
skepticism in HLP about the continuum of financial and human capital for terrorist groups. Justice 
Breyer has alluded to an analogous continuum in the past, discussing the Court’s institutional capital. 
See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 157–58 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the “public’s 
confidence” in the Supreme Court as a “treasure” that the Court must safeguard if it is to act 
effectively in the future); see also Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic 
Constitution 18 (2005) (discussing the importance of considering the social and political 
consequences of decisions). 
 342. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J. 
concurring). 
 343. See 10 Annals of Cong. 611 (1800) (statement of John Marshall) (warning against intrusive 
judicial scrutiny of extradition requests); cf. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 702 (2008) (declining to 
enjoin the transfer to Iraqi authorities of an American citizen accused of committing crimes in Iraq, 
Margulies_63-HLJ-455 (Do Not Delete) 1/24/2012 6:08 PM 
514  HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:455 
deference to Congress in areas such as immigration.344 Moreover, the 
political-question doctrine encourages parties to resolve differences 
about foreign policy through public debate, free of the specter of hasty 
judicial intervention.345 In addition, courts have curbed damages actions 
against officials in national security matters to temper hindsight bias that 
might chill official decisionmaking.346 Evidentiary privileges, some of 
which have constitutional implications, also turn on an assumption that 
defeating truth in the courtroom will yield socially beneficial conduct 
elsewhere.347 
Ex ante concerns are no stranger to First Amendment jurisprudence. 
To give the political branches a chance to frame rules of the road 
internationally, courts permit the government to bar the entry of a 
foreign national whose public remarks will complicate foreign relations.348 
 
absent proof that American officials knew that the individual would be subjected to torture, on the 
grounds that the “second guess[ing]” of executive determinations by the judiciary would “undermine 
the Government’s ability to speak with one voice in this area”). 
 344. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587–88 (1952) (noting that international law has 
traditionally viewed a sovereign state’s power to expel foreign nationals as a necessary element of its 
ability to obtain concessions from other states regarding treatment of its citizens abroad). Acceptance 
of this general proposition does not require an absolute deference to the political branches on 
immigration matters. Procedural and substantive safeguards, for example, should still be required 
under either the Constitution or legislation that implements the U.S.’s international obligations under 
the Refugee Convention and the Convention Against Torture. See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 
1159, 1162 (2009) (overruling an agency determination that precedent barred refugee status for an 
alien who alleged he had been coerced into persecuting others). 
 345. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211–13 (1962) (“[M]any such questions uniquely demand 
single-voiced statement of the Government’s views. Yet it is error to suppose that every case . . . which 
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.”); cf. Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than 
Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 Colum. L. 
Rev. 237, 267–68, 329–32 (2002) (discussing the application of the political-question doctrine in foreign 
affairs and arguing for greater reliance on it). 
 346. See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) (holding that former Attorney General 
John Ashcroft is entitled to qualified immunity for alleged actions at issue in a lawsuit for unlawful 
detention under the federal material-witness statute); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942–43 
(2009) (precluding a lawsuit against senior officials by aliens detained and deported after the 
September 11 attacks); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 580 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (precluding a 
lawsuit by an alleged survivor of extraordinary rendition). For more on these types of lawsuits, see 
Peter Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight: Bivens Actions, National Security Decisions, and the 
Rule of Law, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 195 (2010) (arguing that courts should avoid categorical preclusion or 
intervention, and instead consider whether damage action would further development of effective 
alternatives to overreaching); see also George D. Brown, Accountability, Liability, and the War on 
Terror—Constitutional Tort Suits as Truth and Reconciliation Vehicles, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 193, 234–37 
(2011) (discussing tort suits against officials as legitimate vehicles for accountability, but cautioning 
about negative externalities of such litigation). 
 347.  See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 
1477, 1533–35 (1999).  
 348. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765–70 (1972) (permitting a bar to entry based on a 
“facially legitimate and bona fide” reason). However, when the government provides an express 
reason, such as the assertion that a foreign national provided material support to a DFTO, it should 
confront the applicant with this reason and permit him to offer evidence in rebuttal before denying a 
visa request. See Am. Acad. of Religion v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115, 132–33 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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To manage information asymmetries, courts have required disclosure of 
foreign governments’ sponsorship of movies and other material.349 Courts 
also have enforced bars on disclosure of national security information by 
present and former government employees, in part because such curbs, 
viewed ex ante, encourage the government to share information among 
officials who must decide and execute policy.350 In the domestic realm, 
the Supreme Court has permitted regulation of the distribution chain of 
child pornography because it determined that such measures were 
necessary to curb incentives for the production of child pornography.351 
Courts distinguish between political opinion and speech acts that further 
criminal conspiracies, in order to diminish incentives for illegal 
conduct.352 Ex ante rationales also play a dual role in the doctrine 
supporting curbs on pretrial publicity.353 Such limits encourage advocates 
to frame their arguments to fit the judicial forum.354 In addition, limits on 
pretrial publicity protect privileged information, which often arises from 
socially beneficial conduct that privileges seek to encourage.355 
This modest list of examples demonstrates that HLP’s reliance on 
ex ante arguments does not marginalize the Court’s analysis. On the 
contrary, the ex ante turn is a familiar trope in precedent on both foreign 
affairs and the First Amendment. Few bastions of doctrine would remain 
intact if the Court abruptly disclaimed reliance on such reasoning. 
 
 349. See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480–85 (1987); see also supra notes 138–46 (discussing 
Keene). 
 350. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 289 (1981). 
 351. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759–60 (1982). But see United States v. Stevens, 130 S. 
Ct. 1577, 1585–86 (2010) (declining to extend this rationale to depictions of animal cruelty); see also 
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (holding that picketers carrying antigay placards in a 
public place near a military funeral could not be sued in tort because their communication regarded a 
matter of public concern). 
 352. See United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 114–15 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the First 
Amendment did not prohibit prosecution of the so-called “blind sheik,” when the defendant had 
recommended targeting military installations to individuals whom he knew had access to explosives 
and who had sought his advice regarding possible targets). For scholarly discussion of the difference 
between protected and unprotected speech, see Kent Greenawalt, Speech, Crime, and the Uses of 
Language 57–65 (1989) (discussing the doctrinal distinction between political speech and speech in 
furtherance of a conspiracy); Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A 
Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1765, 1801–02 (2004) (noting 
that criminal solicitation is unprotected); Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 
1095, 1217 (2005) (suggesting a test for distinguishing between protected and unprotected speech 
assisting crime). 
 353. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1054–56 (1991). 
 354. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
 355. See Posner, supra note 347, at 1530–33. The ex ante perspective also figures in “definitional 
balancing” that determines what types of communication receive First Amendment protection. See 
Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and 
Press?, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180, 1192–93 (1970) (arguing that the importance of encouraging creativity 
through protection of intellectual property helps justify copyright’s limits on speech). 
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However, ex ante arguments are not trumps for every occasion. As 
with the pretrial-publicity context, HLP’s ex ante perspective supports 
discrete limits on speech only in particular relationships. In this context, 
information asymmetries and the need for rules of the road require such 
limits. Ex ante rationales do not justify comprehensive limits on the 
expression of ideas. 
B. The Virtues of Departing from Doctrine 
Within HLP’s parameters, the Court’s holding appropriately trades 
off doctrinal elegance for pragmatic results. Doctrinal tests are not 
carved in stone. The Court constructs them to send signals to a spectrum 
of audiences, including government officials, citizens, and foreign 
powers.356 Sometimes, fine-tuning those signals requires flexibility. 
In the situation that the Court addressed in HLP, linking a modest 
retreat on substantive scrutiny with safe harbors that protect democratic 
values wins out over rigid adherence to doctrinal commands.357 For the 
Court, the statute’s inclusion of a safe harbor for independent advocacy 
served a vital signaling function. By permitting a substantial range of 
expression and disclaiming any effort to curb ideas, Congress displayed 
an awareness of “its own responsibility to consider how its actions may 
implicate constitutional concerns.”358 If one views strict scrutiny as a 
proxy for concern about the government’s intent,359 Congress’s signaling 
of its capacity for deliberation justified a more relaxed hybrid approach. 
Legislatures and agencies fashion rules like this all the time, by 
linking clear norms with the authority to grant waivers.360 Only a 
mechanical view of judicial decisionmaking would deny that courts 
engage in that calculus.361 Courts have always done this in constitutional 
 
 356. See Fallon, supra note 40, at 38 (discussing the implementation of constitutional norms and 
values that help shape the formulation of legal standards); Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional 
Decision Rules, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1, 30–50 (2004) (discussing the formulation of prophylactic rules, such 
as Miranda, that help prevent violations of constitutional rights); Chesney, supra note 241, at 1392–
1402 (discussing factors that influence the framing of doctrine); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution 
Outside the Constitution, 117 Yale L.J. 408, 436–42 (2007) (noting the influence of instrumental and 
institutional factors on the construction of doctrinal tests). 
 357. See Araiza, supra note 8, at 834–35 (arguing that HLP is a pragmatic accommodation of 
competing values); cf. Pildes, supra note 40 (discussing virtues of doctrinal flexibility). 
 358. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2728 (2010). 
 359. Cf. Fallon, supra note 40, at 81–82 (noting that the Court may view the likelihood of 
reasonable disagreement—as opposed to studied ignorance or animus—as a basis for judicial deference). 
 360. Indeed, this authority is part of Congress’s comprehensive scheme for addressing terrorist 
organizations and other hostile foreign powers. See 31 C.F.R. § 501.801(c) (2011) (authorizing the 
granting of licenses to nongovernmental organizations supplying aid “for the purpose of relieving 
human suffering”). 
 361. See Araiza, supra note 8, at 834–35 (arguing that HLP is a pragmatic solution to a doctrinal 
clash); Rosenthal, supra note 8, at 59 (discussing the inevitability of balancing in First Amendment 
doctrine); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(warning against “the rigidity dictated by doctrinaire textualism” in separation of powers cases). 
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law, although they sometimes disguise their handiwork as a function of 
the law of remedies rather than as a substantive adjustment.362 Indeed, 
without freedom to adjust doctrinal tests, the courts often would be 
powerless not just to vindicate legitimate governmental interests but also 
to protect vulnerable communities that do not fit neatly into doctrinal 
pigeonholes.363 This is too high a price to maintain doctrinal purity. 
Conclusion 
Analyzing the interaction of counterterrorism measures with the 
First Amendment, as the attorney example illustrates, turns on the scope 
of asymmetries in information and the corresponding need for rules of 
the road. When a measure allows government to better manage 
asymmetries between the U.S. and foreign powers, courts usually will act 
as the Supreme Court did in HLP. However, courts will be less 
deferential if the government seems intent on stifling public debate, 
independent inquiry, and legal challenges. Courts have issued decisions 
along these pragmatic lines instead of paying homage at doctrine’s altar. 
To see why an absolutist approach to First Amendment doctrine 
would be a mistake, we should consider a familiar example from private 
law: two parties looking to make a deal. An agent, such as a lawyer, can 
facilitate an agreement, managing the asymmetries in information that 
impede an agreement. However, in a nightmare of private bargaining, 
the lawyer may intentionally or inadvertently assist her client in 
defecting, compounding asymmetries of information and skewing 
incentives for cooperation in the future. 
The regulation of lawyers illustrates how courts cope pragmatically 
with an agency relationship. A decision like Milavetz casts courts as 
 
 362. See Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 82, at 1810–16 (noting the interaction between 
substantive doctrine, remedies, and political crosscurrents); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and 
Remedial Equilibration, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 857, 884–85 (1999) (arguing that over time courts will 
define rights such as the right to nondiscriminatory public education or freedom from cruel and 
unusual punishment to promote manageable remedial regimes); cf. Fallon, supra note 40, at 49–50 
(noting the importance of manageability in shaping doctrine). 
 363. For example, the quasi-suspect status of gender under the Equal Protection Clause began as a 
pragmatic response to inadequacies in existing doctrine. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–98 
(1976); Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer 
Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 41–43 (1972); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–36 
(1996) (applying the usually deferential rational basis review to invalidate a state constitutional 
provision that barred relief for victims of discrimination based on sexual orientation); Plyler v. Doe, 
457 U.S. 202, 226 (1982) (striking down a state bar to public education for undocumented noncitizen 
children as entrenching on an “area of special constitutional sensitivity,” while acknowledging that 
states could impose restrictions on undocumented noncitizens in other contexts, and holding that 
education is not a fundamental right); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) 
(applying rational basis review to strike down a provision apparently directed at excluding “hippie 
communes” from a food-stamp program); cf. Sunstein, supra note 40 (discussing the need to depart 
from doctrine when values conflict). 
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managing information asymmetries between lawyer and client through 
disclosure mandates, while also upholding regulation that defuses 
collective-action problems by enforcing rules of the road. Ethics 
regulation of pretrial publicity extends this approach beyond the realm of 
commercial speech. Regulation protects the specialized forum of the 
judicial system, which channels deliberation through a web of evidentiary 
privileges and other constraints. Ethics regulation also provides a safe 
harbor for lawyers who keep the state honest by challenging government 
policies. 
Since the dawn of debate about the Constitution, worry about 
information asymmetries between American officials and foreign powers 
has affected governing institutions. Provisions of the Constitution such as 
the Foreign Gifts Clause owe their inclusion to such anxieties. The 
Founding Era also saw a bifurcation of such concerns into two strands. 
One was a paranoid strand that, as in the Sedition Act, targeted the 
expression of ideas, and the other was a more functional strand 
addressing asymmetries in information about the aims of foreign powers. 
Since the 1950s, courts have used interpretive devices like the avoidance 
canon to thwart the regulation of ideas while upholding tailored 
measures that promote moderation and clear signals from foreign 
powers. 
Global terrorism has made it both more difficult and more 
imperative to separate the paranoid and functional strands. Terrorist 
groups exploit asymmetries in information as a means of doing business. 
DFTOs use the goodwill they earn from nonviolent activities to fund 
violence and to cement support for future attacks. Congress passed the 
material-support statute to manage the asymmetries in information on 
which DFTOs trade. To accomplish this goal, the statute prohibits 
agency relationships with DFTOs, even though regulating those 
relationships in some manner also limits the content of speech. The 
statute meets the test of heightened scrutiny, which can rely both on ex 
ante rationales and on insights about DFTOs’ history of using both peace 
negotiations and international law for strategic purposes. 
However, passing muster under heightened scrutiny also requires 
safe harbors for independent advocates, human rights monitors, and 
attorneys. Protecting the work of such groups requires a test akin to 
agency. Legal representation receives special solicitude because of the 
lawyer’s key role as an intermediary between the state and private 
parties. 
There is an inescapable hybridity to this approach, as there is to the 
regulation of lawyers. First Amendment absolutists will reject HLP’s 
pragmatic accommodations of this story. Indeed, HLP could still turn out 
to be a mistake, if the ominous undertones of the Court’s discussion of 
“legitimacy” herald a trimming of the Brandenburg test, or if the 
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decision’s studied deference spurs governmental overreaching. However, 
the Court’s insistence on safe harbors should neutralize progovernment 
information asymmetries and preserve the core virtues of public debate. 
That is a worthwhile venture for any constitutional vision. 
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